Counterinsurgency the role of paramilitaries by Espino, Irineo C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-12
Counterinsurgency the role of paramilitaries
Espino, Irineo C.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited











 Thesis Advisor:   Gaye Christoffersen 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries 
6. AUTHOR(S) Irineo C. Espino 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis examines the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency operations being launched by the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA). The 
Philippine government and the AFP firmly believe that the present Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary 
(CAA) is an essential component of the AFP’s Operational clear-hold-support methodology. 
Many scholars have argued that separating the Communist guerrillas from the populace is an important element in 
winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Isolating the Communist insurgents is done through the creation of local militia. 
However, some authors contend it would be dangerous for any government to train paramilitary forces because, in the long 
term, the governments are unsure of the future loyalties of these paramilitary forces. They may currently be working for the 
government, but as they work and gain skills, these paramilitary forces could use these same skills against the government in 
the future. Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces. 
The Philippine paramilitaries are good examples of paramilitary forces being used effectively for counterinsurgency. 
Their primary task of protecting the communities and the people from the coercive and abusive acts of the Communist 
insurgents are achieved. They are an effective counterinsurgency force because of proper training as well as command and 
control. 
This thesis concludes that the Philippine government and the AFP are headed in the right operational direction for 
utilizing paramilitary forces for village defense and as the protectors of the people. The paramilitary forces in the Philippines 
need the proper training as well as command and control in order to make these paramilitary forces effective counterinsurgency 
forces. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
94 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Paramilitary Forces, Counterinsurgency Operations, The Philippines, Armed 
Forces of the Philippines, AFP, Communist Party of the Philippines, CCP, New People’s Army, NPA, 
Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary, CAA, Paramilitary Forces, 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE ROLE OF PARAMILITARIES 
 
 
Irineo C. Espino 
Colonel, Philippine Army 
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1979 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
















Approved by:  Gaye Christoffersen 
   Thesis Advisor 
 
   
   Lyman Miller 
   Thesis Co-Advisor 
 
 
   James J. Wirtz 




























This thesis examines the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency 
operations being launched by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA). The 
Philippine government and the AFP firmly believe that the present Civilian Armed Force 
Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) is an essential component of the AFP’s 
Operational clear-hold-support methodology. 
Many scholars have argued that separating the Communist guerrillas from the 
populace is an important element in winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Isolating 
the Communist insurgents is done through the creation of local militia. However, some 
authors contend, it would be dangerous for any government to train paramilitary forces 
because, in the long term, the governments are unsure of the future loyalties of these 
paramilitary forces. They may currently be working for the government, but as they work 
and gain skills, these paramilitary forces could use these same skills against the 
government in the future. Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces. 
The Philippine paramilitaries are good examples of paramilitary forces being used 
effectively for counterinsurgency. Their primary task of protecting the communities and 
the people from the coercive and abusive acts of the Communist insurgents is being 
achieved. They are an effective counterinsurgency force because of proper training as 
well as command and control. 
This thesis concludes that the Philippine government and the AFP are headed in 
the right operational direction by utilizing paramilitary forces for village defense and as 
the protectors of the people. The paramilitary forces in the Philippines need the proper 
training as well as command and control in order to make these paramilitary forces 
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The communist insurgency in the Philippines has continuously wrought havoc on 
Philippine society while affecting millions of Filipinos for the past 35 years. The 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army 
(NPA), has exploited the people, expanded their influence and capitalized on the 
weaknesses of both the Philippine government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP). Their goal has been the creation of a Marxist state. The CPP has exploited the 
popular grievances of economic inequality, land disputes, monopolistic industries, 
corrupt leadership and an elite class more concerned with its own self-interests than with 
the public good. “The macro-level maldistribution of wealth, un- and underemployment, 
poverty, anxiety, the collapse of traditional social structures, corruption, factionalization, 
frustration brought about by unrealistic expectations concerning the government’s 
capabilities, repression, weak national identity and inadequate political mechanisms for 
peaceful change” are preconditions for insurgency according to Steven Metz.1 
“The prime political objective of guerrilla action is to overrun a barangay 
(village), to hold it, consolidate it, and develop it into a communist cell.”2 The CPP sends 
out party cadres to indoctrinate and organize the local populace in their ideology, and to 
establish a shadow government. The cell provides shelter and intelligence to the NPA. 
Within the cell, the Communists collect taxes, recruit new members and mete out instant 
justice to people who conspire with the government. The Communists had control of 
approximately 20% of the 42,000 barangays in 1986. The Communist movement has 
gradually increased its operation and has grown into a force estimated at 15,000 to 22,500 
guerrillas with a local militia of 20,000 and a mass base of one million citizens.3    
The growth of these communist cells could have been stopped if the Philippine 
government and the AFP had pursued a serious counterinsurgency campaign against the 
                                                 
1 Steven Metz, “The Future of Insurgency,” U.S. Army War College, December 10, 1993. 
2 Claude A. Buss, Cory Aquino and the People of the Philippines, (California: Stanford Alumni 
Association, 1987), p. 120. 
3 Ibid., p. 122. 
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CPP/NPA. “Combating the guerrillas is both a military and a political problem.”4 The 
counterinsurgency campaign could have eliminated these communist cells if the 
government and the armed forces pursued the three major tasks simultaneously: 1) the 
military defeat of the guerrilla forces, 2) the separation of the guerrilla from the 
population, and 3) the re-establishment of governmental authority and social order.5 
The earlier paramilitary forces originally called the Barrio Self-Defense Units 
(BSDU) and later renamed the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF), were appropriate 
to oppose the militias organized by the NPA. However, the government militias were 
improperly utilized and unjustly treated by the government because they received only a 
few pesos as compensation for their services.6 The armed forces failed to provide the 
proper cadres and appropriate training to these militias on how to do their job.  
This thesis assesses how paramilitaries can help the AFP in combating the 
Communist insurgents, and in particular in the task of separating the insurgents from the 
population. Paramilitaries play a major role in the AFP Operational clear-hold-support 
methodology. The mobile forces, which are the maneuver battalions, are responsible for 
the conduct of internal security operations while the territorial forces consisting of the 
government paramilitaries and the local police are responsible for village defense. Both 
the local police and paramilitaries provide protection to the communities and the people 
by preventing the re-entry or incursion of the Communist insurgents. 
The present Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) of 
the AFP has been actively involved in the counterinsurgency campaign against the 
Communist insurgency. These paramilitaries were restructured, reorganized, retrained 
and closely supervised by the AFP in order to utilize these paramilitaries effectively 
against the insurgents and not against the people.  
Finally, proper command and control of these paramilitaries by an appropriate 
unit will transform these counterinsurgency forces into more responsive, alert, dedicated, 
and committed territorial forces.     
                                                 
4 Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960’s, (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1962), p. 40. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The peso is a monetary unit used in the Philippines.  
3 
A. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II traces the history of paramilitary forces in the Philippines. The 
paramilitary was introduced in the early 1950’s against the Huks insurgency. The ex-
Huks were re-armed and utilized in counter-guerrilla operations against their former 
comrades. Several militia units were formed and used by the regular troops in the anti-
dissident campaign. The formations of these militias, unfortunately, led to the rise of 
several vigilantes, which explains why the majority of the people became aggrieved since 
abuses and coercion were common occurrences in the early 1970’s. The AFP provides 
the rationale for creating and integrating of the CAA into the AFP campaign strategy. 
The CAA plays a major role in counterinsurgency as effective territorial forces. 
Chapter III focuses on the purpose on the organization of the Civilian Home 
Defense Forces. It includes the basic organization, mission, training and method of 
control and administration of these paramilitary forces. This chapter will also examine 
the threat of the Communist insurgency and the different government responses and the 
AFP strategies against the CPP/NPA. It will also explain the causes of the abuses 
committed by the paramilitaries and the reason why they became ineffective 
counterinsurgency forces. 
Chapter IV examines the organization of a new paramilitary called the Civilian 
Armed Force Geographical Units Active Auxiliary. It explains the mission, incentives 
and the concept of the paramilitary program. This chapter also discusses the different 
AFP strategies and the role of the paramilitaries in the counterinsurgency campaign 
against the Communist insurgency.  
Chapter V discusses the lessons learned for utilizing the paramilitary forces in the 
counterinsurgency campaign. It also explains the comparison of the previously organized 
paramilitaries and the present CAA as well as the contributions of paramilitaries in the 
counterinsurgency strategy.  
Chapter VI concludes with a recommendation on how to enhance and improve the 
utilization of paramilitaries in a counterinsurgency campaign. Paramilitaries can help the 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
5 
II. HISTORY OF PARAMILITARY FORCES IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the Japanese occupation, the Philippines was beset by the growing Huk 
insurgency. The Huk rebellion had amassed weapons and armaments taken from the 
Japanese during the war and the liberation period. There were about 100,000 Huks with 
as many as 12,000 armed.7 The movement had a large membership because of its 
conviction, nationalism, and perhaps, idealism to drive out the Japanese invaders.   
Huks, an abbreviated form of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa 
Hapon) means the People’s Army Against the Japanese. It was a group formed in a 
remote village in Central Luzon on March 29, 1942 to fight the Japanese invaders.8 The 
Huks were described as a “tricky, elusive, hard- hitting guerrilla outfit that is rigidly 
disciplined, indoctrinated and operated under tight Communist rule.”9 The Huk guerrillas 
harassed the Japanese at any opportune moment, propagated the communist ideology in 
the rural people and fought the anti-communist guerrilla units.10 The Huks had been 
fighting the Japanese since 1942 and they decided to resume the armed struggle even 
though the United States had granted the Philippines independence in 1946. The men 
who had been fighting the Japanese invaders were now fighting for themselves. They 
wanted a share of the land for which they had fought. The army of 30,000 soldiers was 
helpless to contain the 12,000 armed guerrillas because of the cooperation of an estimated 
one million Filipinos.11   
 
                                                 
7 Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism, (California: Stanford University Press, 
1955), p. 28. 
8 Ibid., p. 3. 
9 Guy J. Pauker, Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative 
Examination of Failures and Successes and Their Likely Implications for the Future, (California: The Rand 
Corporation, 1985), p. 28. 
10 Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, (Manila: Philippine Education 
Company, 1957), p. 377. 
11 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, (Washington D. 
C.:Brassey’s Inc., 2002), p. 136. 
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On April 28, 1950, the Huks changed their name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng 
Bayan (HMB) or People’s Liberation Army. Several atrocities and coercions were 
committed by the HMB against the people and the government. The Philippine 
government waged an active anti-Huk campaign (referring to HMB) with extensive U.S. 
military assistance.  Ramon Magsaysay, who was the Secretary of Defense and later 
became President, reorganized and streamlined the armed forces by discharging or 
retiring undesirable soldiers and rewarding those who did well. The armed forces became 
involved in partisan politics and career officers filled high government posts.12 The 
author would argue that Magsaysay wanted to maximize the power of the civilian 
authority over the military. According to Michael C. Desch, “a state facing low external 
threat and high internal threats should experience the weakest civilian control of the 
military.”13 Magsaysay’s campaign strategy against the insurgents in the early 1950’s 
was focused on a combination of reformed armed forces and a policy of attraction that 
proved effective against the Huks insurgency in 1951. “Counter- guerrilla warfare, then, 
is an extremely difficult kind of war to wage- indeed, far more so than the clash of 
armies- because the war cannot be won without extensive reforms.”14 Magsaysay formed 
the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) as part of the army.15 EDCOR was a 
resettlement and homestead program for the ex-Huks in order to rehabilitate them as 
loyal and productive citizens. The government propaganda and campaign strategy were 
effective because the Huk insurgency was defeated. 
B. ORIGIN OF PARAMILITARY FORCES 
The paramilitary was introduced into the Philippine counterinsurgency effort 
against the Huks as early as the 1950’s. The homestead became a reward to ex-Huks for 
surrendering to government forces and for participating in counter-guerrilla operations 
against their former comrades. The surrendered insurgents were utilized as militia against 
their former comrades. Another typical civilian volunteer was the group of former United 
States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) guerrillas who wanted to contribute their 
                                                 
12 Roland E. Dolan, Philippines:  A Country Study, (DA Pam 550- 72, 1993), p. 246. 
13 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, 
(Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 14. 
14 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), p. 125. 
15 Scaff, p. 38. 
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spare time to patriotic service.16 The counterinsurgency effort started to develop a grass-
roots political organization, or the “barangay” movement with paramilitary 
characteristics. Military operations became effective with strong armed forces and 
civilian volunteer counter-guerrillas.17 The 7th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) developed 
the model paramilitary called civilian guards. The guards were provided with radios, 
trained and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns.18 Civilian guards took orders 
from the military but they were employees of local elites who were disliked by the people 
because of a bad reputation.  Suppressing the Huk insurgency became the primary 
mission of the armed forces while also maintaining peace and order in the countryside. 
According to former Secretary of National Defense Angelo T. Reyes, “that the mission 
was sometimes complicated by the fact that the hacenderos-owners of large estates tilled 
by tenants-maintained private armies, ostensibly to protect their haciendas and their 
persons from the Huks and other criminal elements.”19 Secretary Reyes was emphatic 
that these private armies were also used as tools of intimidation and control. 
Ten Battalion Combat Teams were organized pursuant to The Army 
Appropriation Act for 1950 to address the Huk insurgency.20 Several militia units were 
organized to assist the regular troops in the anti-dissident campaign. They came under 
different names, such as Civilian Guards, Civilian Commando Units, Home Guards or 
Special Police. These militias were used in the following ways:21 
• As security for the town or barrios to protect the lives and property of the 
civilians. 
• As a blocking force to intercept the movements of the insurgents and their 
supplies. 
 
                                                 
16 Instrument of Statescraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940- 
1990, “Toward a New Counterinsurgency: Philippines, Laos and Vietnam”, 
http://www.statecraft.org/chapter4.html (June 29, 2004). 
17 A barangay is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines, roughly equivalent to a rural 
village or urban neighborhood.  
18 Ibid., p. 15. 
19 Speech of Ambassador Angelo T. Reyes at the Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University 
on October 9, 2003.  
20 Scaff, p. 37. 
21 Restituto L. Aguilar, “Sibul CAA Detachment: The Longest Serving Militia Facility in Western 
Luzon,” Army Journal, 4th Quarter Issue, 2001. 
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• As guides and helpers to carry supplies for the government troops. 
• As a strike force in coordination with regular armed forces units.    
In early 1968, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reactivated its counter-
insurgency machinery due to increased dissident activities. It was assessed that a 
communist movement was formed and composed of a few dozen peasant rebels who 
were remnants of the Huk movement. “The Communist Party of the Philippines had 
grown to nearly 2,000 members and poorly armed New People’s Army (NPA) squads 
were launching hit-and–run ambushes in Central Luzon, the Sierra Madre of northeast 
Luzon and a few other pockets of the 1,000 mile-long archipelago.”22 There are several 
different types of guerrilla movements, as well as different levels of guerrilla conflict. 
According to Gerard Chaliand, “the most important element in guerrilla campaign is the 
underground political infrastructure, rooted in the population itself and coordinated by 
middle-ranking cadres.”23 Through this element, it will guarantee growth; provide the 
necessary recruits, information and local logistics. The CPP is an underground movement 
with a framework for a revolutionary struggle aimed to overthrow the government. 
The AFP’s response to the emerging insurgency was to formulate active measures 
to contain the insurgency by denial and counter-insurgency operations.24 Denial 
operations were meant to deprive the insurgents of logistical, intelligence and other 
foodstuff support from the local populace. The counter-insurgency operations involved 
pacification drives through the conduct of small-unit patrols, and continuous combat 
operations in the insurgent infested areas. In 1970, the armed forces started to sanction 
the organization of civilian volunteers initially under the operational supervision of the 
Philippine Constabulary utilized for intelligence and information gathering, and later 
used for counterinsurgency operations against the growing insurgents in Central Luzon.25 
The AFP formed and organized the Barrio Self-Defense Units (BSDU) in the affected 
areas under the direct supervision of the Philippine Constabulary. 
                                                 
22 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement, (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1989), p. 6. 
23 Gerard Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies: An historical Anthology from the Long March to 
Afghanistan, (California: University of California Press, 1982), p. 10. 
24 Army Journal, 4th Quarter Issue, 2001. 
25 Justus M. van der Kroef, Aquino’s Philippines: The Deepening Security Crisis, The Centre for 
Security and Conflict Studies, (England: The Eastern Press Limited, 1988), p. 17. 
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The action of the armed forces was based on the Department of Defense order no. 
445 issued on July 10, 1971. It contained the organization, operation and utilization of the 
Barrio Self-Defense Units and other similar units, which were under the jurisdiction of 
the Undersecretary for Home Defense.26 BSDU was a legitimate militia organization 
formed to assist the Philippine Constabulary against the insurgency movement.   
The thrust of the armed forces was to provide the BSDU with arms and cadres for 
the immediate defense of their communities against the insurgents. A BSDU organization 
was composed of five enlisted men and five civilian volunteers. The militia was basically 
independent in their operations and controlled by the enlisted men, who in the long run, 
became their buddies and partners in the performance of their tasks of protecting the 
communities. The BSDU was doing well in the early stages of its inception but became a 
liability to the armed forces due to their illegal activities and abuse of authority over the 
civilians. “The principal task was to tackle the political, social and economic conditions 
that bred support for the guerrillas in the first place- that is, they must regain the “hearts 
and minds” of the populace.”27 The author would argue that the armed forces lost the 
hearts and minds of the populace because of the dissatisfaction and grievances of the 
civilians toward the BSDU.  
The militia members heavily relied on the support of barrio (village) officials and 
members of the community for their operational needs and probably even their personal 
needs because this militia was not one of the government’s priorities in terms of both 
organizational and operational support. It was not surprising that many militia members 
became bodyguards of influential people and politicians because of remunerations and 
benefits they received from them.  Militia members were performing everything for the 
politicians instead of doing their duty as a village defense unit. The problem was 
exacerbated with the feeling of resentment of the people toward the government, which 
had been unable to resolve key issues such as agrarian reform, social services, health 
care, justice and other social services. As Julian Paget argued, “there is no purely military 
battlefield in counter- insurgency warfare, and the campaign can only be won by 
                                                 
26 Army Journal. 
27 Hook and Spanier, p. 125. 
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combined civil- military efforts.”28 The people felt they were ignored and the militia was 
organized to further their suffering because of the abuses of the militias. The people were 
forced to provide material support to the militias for their services. Supporting the BSDU 
was too much of a burden for the people in the barrios because most relied only on their 
harvests for daily sustenance.   
C. COUNTERINSURGENCY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES 
1. Roxas Administration (1946 - 1949) 
The Roxas administration intended to eliminate the Huk in 60 days. 
“Extermination through military action was the basic aim.”29 The Government troops, 
poorly trained and underpaid, were sent to eradicate the Huk menace but failed. The 
troops resorted to maltreating innocent suspects in an effort to extract information. People 
felt that the military was more abusive than the Huks. The government used the policy of 
mediation when the policy of all-out force was not effective. A three-month truce with 
the Huks was arranged where teams composed of government and Huk representatives 
went barrio to barrio to persuade the dissidents to lay down their arms. The truce ended in 
bitter fighting between government forces and the Huks.30  The people feared the military 
more than the insurgents and they continued to support the communists.  
2. Quirino Administration (1949 - 1953) 
The Quirino administration had attempted appeasement and fairness schemes 
toward the insurgents. A negotiation option with the Huk leaders was made, and in the 
process, amnesty was proposed for all to be forgotten and forgiven. Amnesty was 
proclaimed on June 21, 1948.31 However, the Huks demanded extensive reforms in the 
government and they refused to disarm. Few insurgents accepted the amnesty offer, and 
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3. Magsaysay Administration (1954 - 1958) 
Magsaysay, as Secretary of the Department of National Defense in the early 
1950’s,  reorganized the armed forces with the integration of the Philippine Constabulary 
into the Army as a unified command.32 According to Julian Paget, “the second condition 
which is essential to effective civil- military co-operation is the establishment of a unified 
command, with the direction and control of the campaign in the hands of one person.”33  
The Magsaysay strategy changed the image and credibility of the armed forces. He 
punished the undesirable but rewarded those who were effective soldiers. Civil affairs 
officers participated in community activities and tried to win the support of the civilians. 
He established an Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) as part of the army. There 
were homesteads for the Huks who surrendered. They were resettled in Mindanao.  It was 
successful and it caused the collapse of the Huk insurgency. The Philippine government 
won the counterinsurgency campaign. 
4. Marcos Administration (1965 - 1986) 
The Marcos administration reorganized the armed forces to make the military 
more effective in combating the NPA.34 Presidential Decree Number 1086, creating the 
Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF) on September 22, 1976, was issued 
and implemented to assist the AFP in the effective solution to the peace and order 
problem of the country. ICHDF was an integration of all paramilitary units and its 
mission was village defense. The intention of the armed forces was to establish a firm 
base where government troops could actively and aggressively patrol to dominate the 
areas frequented by the insurgents.35  However, the mission and tasks of the ICHDF were 
unclear and its utilization was placed in the hands of both military and police 
commanders who were influenced by the local executives and powerful politicians. This 
militia unit did not receive any training and was not given even enough stipend for their 
services. The people argued that the militia was unfit for the job of protecting the 
community against the newly formed communist movement. The Philippine government 
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had not actually developed a coordinated civilian- political doctrine to combat the 
insurgency.36 At the early stage of an insurgency, the government must declare its 
national policy so that all concerned can work towards one common purpose and plan.37 
Powerful individuals who had connections with the police and military, and those 
who were very influential estate owners, also maintained “private” CHDFs for the 
security of their property as well as for their personal protection. CHDF became abusive 
and counterproductive in the government campaign strategy against the growing 
insurgency threat. CHDF was a failure because the insurgent movement grew in number 
and the people’s support remained with the insurgents.  
5. Aquino Administration (1986 - 1992) 
The Aquino administration disbanded the CHDF and other illegal armed groups 
or private armies not recognized by the duly constituted authority.38 However, after a few 
months, the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliaries (CAA), another 
militia unit, was activated to assist the AFP in confronting the growing insurgency threat. 
This militia unit was trained, better equipped and closely supervised by the AFP in its 
counterinsurgency operations against the CPP/NPA.   
6. Ramos Administration (1992 - 1998) 
President Fidel V. Ramos viewed security in broad terms taking into account 
military, political, economic, societal and environmental factors.39 The AFP has been 
subordinated to civilian leaders and given the task of providing external defense and the 
responsibility against domestic subversion. Michael C. Desch argues that “an externally 
oriented military will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics, especially if 
the state is supplying sufficient resources to execute the military’s external missions.”40  
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Ramos provided the armed forces the needed resources and ensured professional 
leadership. Ramos allowed the armed forces to continue with the CAA program to assist 
the AFP in its counterinsurgency campaign.    
D. RISE OF VIGILANTISM 
The rise of vigilantism, particularly in Mindanao, was due to a growing 
insurgency threat and the need for a “People Power” type response to the NPA threat.41. 
One anti-communist organization that started to function in Davao City was the Alsa 
Masa (Masses Arise) in November 1986 founded by Rolando Cagay, a former NPA “tax 
collector” in Davao City. The Alsa Masa was legitimized by the police because it was an 
effective vigilante against the NPA. The NPA feared the Alsa Masa. Other vigilante 
groups were the NAKASAKA (an acronym for Nakhahiusang Katawhan Alang sa 
Kalinaw or People’s United for Democracy) in Negros, and the Puersa Masa (People 
Power) in Misamis Oriental.42 The people in these areas sided with these vigilante groups 
because they were able to drive out the NPA, eliminated the tax collection as well as the 
NPA’s coercive activities. 
It became very alarming that several vigilante groups started to form because of 
the earlier support provided by the local military and police commanders in the area, such 
as the Davao’s Toktok, Cebu City’s Citizens against Communism Army (CACA), and 
other groups whose actions were no longer against the NPA but rather against their 
personal enemies. The control of these groups became a problem for the military and the 
police. The people would both fear the NPA and the vigilante groups. They could hardly 
distinguish who were communists and anti-communists because of their actions and 
attitudes toward the people. Both became abusive and demanding. 
E. RATIONALE OF EMPLOYMENT OF PARAMILITARY FORCES 
The AFP is a total force. It means that the armed forces are composed of a regular 
and reserve force in order to perform its mission. As mandated in the 1987 Constitution, 
the Philippine government shall maintain a regular force and a reserve force that will 
serve as the expansion base in the event of war, invasion, or national emergencies.  
                                                 
41 Justus M. van der Kroef, Aquino’s Philippines: The Deepening Security Crisis, The Centre for 
Security and Conflict Studies, (England: The Eastern Press Limited, 1988), p. 20. 
42 Ibid., p. 20. 
14 
Due to the prevailing security conditions affecting the country and expansion of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines nationwide, the AFP has to deploy additional 
combat units and recruit additional personnel in order to address the communist problem. 
The national campaign strategy made the AFP the lead role in internal security operations 
with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the supporting role. The AFP has organized 
and activated CAA to complement the AFP in its counterinsurgency campaign strategy.  
Peter Paret and John Shy argued that different tactics must be used against 
guerrillas depending on whether they are well established, closely identified with the 
population or just beginning the process of indoctrination and organization.43 In the case 
of the CPP, it is a 35 year old insurgency that requires serious, lasting and doable 
solutions. The CPP/NPA has no external support and heavily relies on mass base support. 
In many instances, the NPA resorted to extortion, forced taxation, and criminal activities 
such as robbery and kidnapping. During the recent national election of 2004, the NPA 
was able to collect what they call permit-to campaign fees from electoral candidates. 
Parret and Shy mentioned that three major tasks characterized the counter-guerrilla action 
and it was necessary to execute them simultaneously because success in one area depends 
on progress in the others.44 
• The military defeat of the guerrilla forces 
• The separation of the guerrilla from the population  
• The re- establishment of government authority and social order. 
The CAA was primarily to defend the villages from the insurgents’ attacks and 
prevent the re-entry of the insurgents in the villages or communities. Basically, these 
tasks are undertaken to separate the insurgents from the population. The insurgents can 
no longer coerce, intimidate and collect taxes from the populace. The CAA serves as the 
protectors of the people and as security for the villages. In the case of both Malaya and 
Kenya, that the establishment of a Home Guard was the most decisive step in counter-
insurgency warfare.45 
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It is not easy to separate the insurgents from the populace because guerrillas are 
not solitary fighters hiding among the people but mobilize the people to fight against the 
government. “Counter-guerrilla warfare, then, is an extremely difficult kind of war to 
wage- indeed, far more so than the clash of armies-because the war cannot be won 
without extensive reforms.”46 Any counter-insurgency campaign must include political 
and military goals. Julian Paget argues that the military aim is dependent on political 
considerations, and it is essential that the political directive should include three points:47 
• the purpose and scope of military operations 
• the short- term political and military aims governing the campaign 
• the long- term political aim which it hopes to achieve when the military 
campaign is over 
With the CAA and the local police providing the security and defense of the 
communities, the Army can be more mobile and effective in the conduct of COIN.  The 
CAA becomes force multipliers in the internal security operations and is an essential 
component of the Win-Hold-Win Strategy of the AFP. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The paramilitary forces from the CCU to the present CAA had been utilized by 
the AFP as force multipliers in its counterinsurgency operations. The basic mission of 
paramilitary forces is to support the armed forces in maintaining a secured environment 
by safeguarding the community against the communist insurgents. The civilian guards 
were organized in 1949 to fight the Huk insurgents. The guards took orders from the 
military but they were tied directly to the local elites and the people disliked them for 
having a bad reputation. The Barrio Self- Defense Units were organized in 1971 after the 
civilian guards were disbanded to assist the Philippine Constabulary in its campaign 
against the Communists Party of the Philippines. Their primary task was intelligence and 
information gathering for identifying and locating the communist insurgents. The BSDU 
became an active component of the Philippine Constabulary in the conduct of combat 
operations against the communist insurgents. In 1976, BSDU was disbanded and a new 
paramilitary unit called CHDF was formed and organized to assist the AFP in 
counterinsurgency campaigns but its mission was focused on village defense under the 
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supervision of the police and the army. The CHDF was disbanded in 1987 due to alleged 
irregularities and illegal activities. CAA was organized a few months after the CHDF was 
deactivated. The CAA’s primary mission is to defend the villages from insurgents’ 
attacks and to prevent the re-entry of the insurgents into the villages. The CAA was 
placed under the close supervision of Army units after the separation of the Philippine 
Constabulary from the AFP in 1990, and placed under the Department of Interior and 
Local Government (DILG).  
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III. CIVILIAN HOME DEFENSE FORCE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the rise of the New Peoples Army (NPA), the government authorized the 
formation of local militias originally known as the Barrio Self-Defense Unit (BSDU) and 
later as the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF).48 The BSDU was organized in the 
early 1960’s and composed of five enlisted men and five civilian volunteers. The main 
motive of the BSDU was to take responsibility for the immediate defense of the local 
community from the growing communist movement. It was increased to 15 members to 
deprive the insurgents of logistics, intelligence and other types of support from the local 
population effectively. The services of the BSDU in the community were compensated 
by the community providing subsistence and other provisions because they received 
nothing from the government except the firearms for protecting themselves and the 
community from the insurgents. 
B. THREAT OF THE NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY 
The New People’s Army (NPA), the military arm of the CPP expanded very 
rapidly. The NPA has established itself throughout the Philippines. The NPA organized 
the peasantry to demand reduction of land rent and helped the farmers to form production 
cooperatives. The NPA commanded a broad base of popular support and able to organize 
the people’s militia.49 New guerilla fronts were formed and the number of villages falling 
in the guerrilla zones.  
The NPA was actively attacking poorly defended armed forces detachments with 
the intent to acquire more weapons and ammunitions. The raid of the armory at the 
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), the country’s equivalent of West Point, in 
December 30, 1970 was one successful effort of the NPA to generate arms from the  
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government. Approximately 21 automatic rifles, 14 carbines, six machine guns, one 
bazooka, grenade launchers, and more than 5,000 rounds of ammunition were carted 
away by NPA guerrillas led by a former constabulary officer Victor Corpus.50 
The NPA raided the towns of Mapanao and Gamay in northern Samar in April 
1979 where they disarmed the police and military and conducted dialogue with the 
people emphasizing their needs and problems. The NPA left the areas with weapons and 
communication equipment taken from the police and military.51 
Theodore G. Shackley argues, “the 26,000- strong New People’s Army (NPA) 
appears variously as terrorists, urban guerrillas, or rural guerrillas.”52 The NPA was 
terrorists because they threaten to kill American business executives. They are also 
considered urban guerrillas because they assassinate policemen and United States soldiers 
by the so called “sparrow squads”. In addition, they are rural guerrillas because they 
attack police stations and ambush military convoys.53  
1. Communism Reemerged 
The resurgence of communism in the Philippines was started by a small group of 
academics led by Jose Maria Sison. He was a prolific writer and author of the book 
Philippine Society and Revolution. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), 
Maoist in orientation was founded in December 1969.54 After a few months, a group of 
guerrillas led by a certain Commander Dante joined the CPP, which was the beginning of 
the expansion of communism in the Philippines. 
2.  Sison’s Strategy 
In the early years of the insurgency, Sison adopted one key element of Mao’s 
strategy, the development of stable base areas in the countryside. “The key to a successful 
revolution in the Philippines, Sison confidently declared, was a measured, stage-by-stage 
war led by a peasant army operating from “stable base areas” in the countryside and 
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guided by the theories of Mao.”55 The concept was not properly defined resulting in 
various interpretations by the cadres. The CPP Central Committee discarded the concept 
in late 1974 in favor of creating a mobile guerilla base. Sison dispatched several cadres 
throughout the country to develop guerilla fronts simultaneously instead of concentrating 
on a single base area.  
The primary motive of Sison’s strategy was self-reliant and autonomous guerilla 
fronts. The guerilla bases would be situated in the provincial boundaries. This situation 
favors the guerilla fronts’ political and military influence over two or three provinces. 
Guerrilla operations would be conducted in a wide area and in a decentralized fashion.56  
The strategy of the guerrilla is to force the government troops to spread out in all 
directions and force them to set up permanent bases.57 Small groups of government 
forces must be surrounded and destroyed and their equipment seized. Another advantage 
of the communist movement was that “the government would be forced to dispense its 
forces and would unable to destroy the rebels on any one island.”58 Sison believed that 
fighting a prolonged guerrilla struggle in a country with many scattered islands would be 
difficult but in the long run, it would turn into the long- term strength of the CPP. The 
mountainous geography if used properly would also offer great advantages to the NPA 
according to Sison. He knew the difficulty of waging war simultaneously on all fronts. 
For this reason, the central committee, the regional as well as local personnel must be 
politically autonomous and materially self-sufficient. Guerrilla operations would be 
decentralized in nature. 
During the 20th Anniversary of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the 
Central Committee in its anniversary message stated “the guerrilla warfare with the  
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enthusiastic support of the masses must be extensively and intensively employed to wipe 
out and disarm the enemy, destroy his anti- people facilities and drain him of his strength 
politically, militarily, economically and morally.”59 
Geography is a risk factor in conflict according to Paul Collier. “Geography 
matters because if the population is highly geographically dispersed, then the country is 
harder for the government to control than if everyone lives in the same small area.”60 The 
risk of conflict was more likely because it is unusually hard for the armed forces to 
control the population.   
The CPP/NPA was able to exploit the popular grievances against the government. 
The problems that beset the country included economic inequality, land disputes, 
monopolistic industries, corrupt leadership and an elite class more concerned with self- 
interest than with the public good.  According to Stephen Metz, “the insurgent strategies 
would attempt to try to mobilize the discontented and frustrated by emphasizing the 
uneven distribution of the rewards of economic development.”61 The grievances evolved 
over economic deprivation, social injustice, government corruption and abuse of power.62 
The government was weak that governmental programs could not be implemented due to 
the patronage of a network that limits the authority of the people in power. There were no 
coherent governmental programs that could be implemented because the authorities were 
not free of the oligarchic connections. After the 1986 People Power revolution when the 
democratic government was restored, the government was unable to form policies that 
undermined the oligarchic power structure.63 
John W. Sloan argues, “In the mind of the new military officer, the lack of 
economic development is the most significant national weakness because it invites  
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aggression by more developed states and subversion by leftist guerrillas. The conditions 
associated with underdevelopment are threats to national security and are therefore of 
increasing concern for military officers.”64 
3. Communist Two-Stage Agrarian Revolution 
The communist revolution is “a struggle for land among the peasants.”65 Sison 
had outlined a two- stage agrarian revolution to be executed in the countryside. The 
landlords would be forced to lower farm rents and interest rates. When the areas are 
already controlled by the NPA, lands would be taken from their owners and given to poor 
peasants. The landlords deemed the “parasites” of society would be eliminated as a 
class.66 The land rentals in areas controlled by the NPA were lowered and peasants’ 
livelihood had improved. The communist land reform became an effective means of 
winning the loyalty and support of the peasants. The CPP’s slogan “Land to the tillers” 
was proven attractive to many desperate peasants.67 The CPP was successful in 
mobilizing the poor peasants to participate in Party- organized rallies and demonstrations. 
4. Status of the Communist Insurgency 
The CPP/NPA insurgency now can still be categorized in the strategic defensive 
stage whereby “the guerrilla movement concentrates its efforts on building up its military 
and political base support.”68 The insurgents are incapable of controlling the key cities 
and towns or areas that can pose a strategic stalemate with the government troops. 
“Communist leaders had mapped out strategy that called for an escalation of the war in 
1989- 1990, with the hope of forcing a military stalemate by 1992.”69 CPP/NPA was able 
to form as many as 60 fronts around the country and was estimated to have 16,500 troops 
and approximately 20 percent of the villages in the country were influenced by the 
NPA.70 Violent atrocities perpetrated by the NPA were being felt in many of the 
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provinces. The Communists always engage under the conditions of their own choosing 
because of superior knowledge of the terrain and they used it to their advantage. The 
guerrillas fight only when the chances of victory are in their favor, they withdraw if the 
tide of battle is against them.71 The NPA was successful in using the terrain to their 
advantage. Their attacks were sudden, violent and short duration. The insurgency 
movement posed a serious challenge to the government. 
The Philippine churches are no exception to the communist expansion. Cardinal 
Jaime Sin has confirmed that Communists have infiltrated his church.72 Radical clergy in 
the Philippines did not only provide funding to the revolution but also openly encourage 
it. Other church officials admitted that a few dozen of the country’s 5,500 priests and 
nuns have joined the armed Communist rebels.73 
The Central Committee message on the 20th CPP Anniversary stated that “the 
ideological, political and organizational strength that the Party has accumulated since 
1968 provide a basis for advancing at a cumulative rate toward the maturation of the 
strategic defensive, further on toward the strategic stalemate and finally toward the 
strategic offensive in the armed revolution.”74  
As of last quarter of CY-2003, CPP/NPA was able to organize 106 guerrilla fronts 
with 8,293 members (93% belong to pro- Sison faction) broken down into 4,337 CPP 
members and 3,956 NPA elements. The total firearms were 5,889. The total number of 
affected “barangays” was 2,490.75 The rising trend in the number of guerrilla fronts since 
1995 had an annual average rate of increase of 11%. Of the 106 fronts, only 14 are  
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categorized as very active and advanced fronts distributed as follows: 6 in Luzon, 3 in 
Visayas and 5 in Mindanao.76 The additional fronts are part of the CPP’s plan to further 
spread the government forces thinly. 
C. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE  
1. Land Reform Program 
The government’s comprehensive land reform program of former president 
Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 gave the small farmers new hope. He instituted a land reform 
program that caused the Huk insurgents to no longer have mass base support upon which 
they had largely depended.77 Magsaysay addressed the root causes of the peasant’s 
rebellion and reestablished the image and credibility of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) that led to the defeat of insurgency after almost eight years of struggle 
against the government 78 
In 1972, the land reform program was characterized by mismanagement and lack 
of integrity on the part of the bureaucracy. Only 132,000 tenants- farmers instead of 
millions in 13 years were offered titles to the land they tilled. The reason was insufficient 
land to be distributed and the government decrees could not overcome the landlord 
resistance. The government also discovered land distribution would not automatically 
increase productivity without capital. Another weakness was 90% of the beneficiaries of 
the program were reluctant to pay their annual installments.79    
When Marcos was deposed, the new administration tried to address the land 
reform issue. The Agrarian Reform Bill was approved by Congress and signed into law in 
1988. “The program aimed to redistribute farm plots to landless peasants and farm 
workers or implement production or profit sharing arrangements between landowners and 
their tenant farmers or plantation workers.”80 All public and private agricultural lands 
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became subject to the land reform program. However, wealthy landowners with some 
backing of prominent politicians tried to find ways to circumvent the program. Only 37% 
of landowners registered their farms for the land reform program and eventual 
redistribution. Many landowners “denounced the effort as communistic and vowed to 
fight- with violence, if necessary- the implementation of agrarian reform.”81 Another 
problem identified was the cost of the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian 
reform program which would cost about $70 billion during the 10 year plan.82 The source 
of funding was unclear, and thus, land reform remained unresolved. 
2. Martial Law declared 
Martial law was imposed in September 21, 1972. The writ of habeas corpus was 
suspended which caused the communists and their supporters to go deep underground. 
The key leaders including its founding chairman were arrested and detained. The military 
and police directly addressed the period of disorder and violence. Law and order was 
restored especially in Manila.  
The streets of Manila, particularly at night, had been amongst the most 
dangerous in the world. Suddenly the atmosphere was transformed: the 
hold- up men, pimps and thieves to be found round any street- corner 
disappeared as if by magic- either locked up or afraid to show their faces-
so that the citizen could get about on his lawful occasions with a quite new 
sense of security.83  
Many had claimed that the early years of martial rule was successful and 
productive because of the earlier successes of the land reform, agricultural and other 
government programs including health and family planning services and the improved 
security situation.  The people’s lives had improved and security was felt even in the 
remote villages.       
According to Ambassador James Alexander Turpin of the British Diplomatic 
Service, one of the crucial objectives of martial law was “to narrow the spectacularly  
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wide gap between the very rich and very poor by encouraging growth in all sectors of the 
economy and thus creating new job opportunities.”84 The emphasis was for all Filipinos 
to have access to the basic amenities. Turpin said these were President Marcos’ words: 
Equality in the sense of our progressive society does mean, however, that 
he is going to have his three square meals, a roof over his head, efficient 
public transport, schooling for his children, and medical care for his 
family. Without these things, he cannot be very productive, trapped in a 
vicious circle: unproductiveness keeps him poor and poverty keeps him 
unproductive.85 
However, the people felt differently as the government become more authoritarian 
than constitutional. “Unemployment rose to 20% and underemployment to 40%, real 
income shrank as inflation increased and corruption reached an intolerable state under 
“crony capitalism” whereby Marcos’ friends were placed in charged of business 
conglomerates despite their lack of business acumen.”86 The country suffered negative 
growth rate and chaotic economy. 
According to Morris Janowitz, “the role of coercion in the developing nations 
requires a perspective that encompasses more than the military, one that can include 
coercive institutions, such as police and paramilitary formations, and the various forms of 
repression.”87 
Political repression, government-military factionalism, economic 
mismanagement, and corruption were critical issues that affected the stability of the 
country. The most prominent issue threatening the stability of the Philippines was the 
growing New People’s Army insurgency.88  
3. Sison and Buscayno Released 
After the People’s Power peaceful revolution in February 1986, Jose Ma Sison, 
the professor- theorist of the revolution, who has been held in solitary confinement for 
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seven years, and Bernabe Buscayno- also known as Commander Dante- who had 
converted the ragged band of outlaws into the most formidable communist resistance 
force in the world today were unconditionally released.89 The government released about 
500 political prisoners and called on the NPA to enter into peace talks with the 
government.  
President Aquino explained her program in these words: 
I will use the power of the state to fight any force, whether communist or 
not, which will seek to overthrow our democratic government or destroy 
our cultural heritage, including our belief in God. But I will respect a 
communist’s right, or anybody’s right for that matter, peacefully to sell his 
ideas to others. I am confident that under a government that enjoys the 
confidence of the people, ideologies that run counter to our cultural and 
religious values will be rejected without need of bloodshed.90 
President Corazon Aquino remarked that if the hard- core communists would 
continue to fight the government, she would fight them with all the means at her disposal. 
On the mass base, she offered them food, medicine, new hope and a better alternative 
than joining or supporting the NPA. She offered amnesty and would allow the CPP to 
operate as an ordinary political party.91 “The National Reconciliation and Development 
Program were established to encourage NPA defections by offering land, job training and 
assimilation into society.”92 The program was a disappointment to the government 
because very few insurgents surrendered. The hard- core communists proclaimed that 
they would fight until imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism were 
eliminated. The policy of reconciliation and peace negotiation with the CPP/NPA did not 
work well. After 60 days of truce, “Cory urged her officers to hit hard and to retaliate 
against any NPA attack.”93 
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4. Peace Talk  
In 1992, the National Democratic Front, the political arm of the CPP and the 
Philippine government started the peace talks. The contentious issues were the treatment 
of political prisoners and victims of human rights violations. The negotiation’s aim was 
to bring to an end to the hostilities and atrocities being perpetrated by the insurgents. 
However, the peace talks did not prevent the NPA from committing high- profile military 
actions such as the raid on police headquarters and the abductions of members of the 
government militia. “Government sources attribute recent NPA activity as attempts by 
the revolutionary forces wanted to obtain a status of belligerency as leverage in the on 
going talks.”94 
D. MILITARY STRATEGY 
The communists’ strategy of expansion from the country side was greatly affected 
by martial law and the already clandestine organization went even deeper underground 
because of the aggressive military campaign against the communist movement. However, 
the outbreak of the Muslim secessionist movements in Mindanao forced the government 
to increase its armed forces.   
The armed forces whose troop size in 1967 was 45,000 had strength of 
164,000 soldiers by 1997.95 The AFP had saturated the areas with troops 
and militias where communists were active. “But even at their increased 
strength the armed forces are not large as a percentage of the population or 
in relation to the terrain they have to cover, and the defense budget is a 
modest one by Western standards.”96  
Eleven infantry battalions and two marine battalions were activated to cover the 
insurgent threatened areas. The rotation of battalions in the combat areas and improved 
logistics lines had increased the combat effectiveness of units against the insurgent 
movements. The fielding of new commanders also contributed to the successful combat 
operations against the NPA. 
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1. The COIN Campaign 
The Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign strategy adopted in 1986 was contained 
in a Letter of Instructions (LOI) Mamayan, indicating people whose goal was to 
neutralize the growing threats of the NPA and the Muslim secessionist groups and to 
secure the villages from the infiltration of insurgents.97 The government favored the 
restructuring of the existing militia organization to address the threat of the insurgents’ 
infiltration of the villages.  The restructured Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) 
would provide security to the villages while the Army and the police were chasing the 
communist insurgents. “The formation of new militia units was viewed by military 
commanders as important steps toward effective COIN.”98 It will provide the physical 
protection of the villages, control the populace and prevent them from supporting the 
insurgents. 
Counterinsurgency is not simply a problem of the armed forces; it should 
be shared by other branches of the government and the civilian population 
as a whole. Since counterinsurgency is a national problem, it is the 
responsibility of everyone.99  
Michael McClintock argues, “the doctrine of counterinsurgency strongly 
emphasized the need both for regular armed forces units with irregular warfare skills and 
for irregular forces, often made up of civilians with a military background to operate in 
their local areas.”100 
Concerned government agencies should be able to assist the AFP and police in 
undertaking measures to stop the resurgence of CPP influence in cleared areas. 
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The 64,000 members of the CHDF were placed in insurgent influenced and 
threatened areas in order to counter Sison’s strategy of self reliant and autonomous 
guerrilla fronts operating nationwide. The main purpose was to deny the insurgents of 
mass base support and infiltration of the villages. 
2. The Legal Basis of the CHDF 
Presidential Decree 1016 mandated the creation of the Integrated Civilian Home 
Defense Forces (ICHDF) on September 22, 1976 in order to assist the armed forces in the 
expeditious and effective solution to the peace and order problem throughout the country 
and to accelerate socio- economic development. There were three categories of CHDF 
that had close connection to the military and the elite:101  
• Active reservists, including planters which provided an excuse for high 
officials and prominent businessmen to carry weapons; 
• Private security guards employed by prominent businessmen; and  
• The bulk of the CHDF, part- time soldiers paid a monthly salary of two 
hundred pesos with an annual clothing allowance of two hundred pesos 
and a nine- thousand- peso insurance policy. 
The ICHDF had 63,000 full time and 10,000 part time members. The monthly pay 
was one factor why many wanted to be militia. Most members were farmers and low 
income earners in the rural areas. The authority to possess firearms was the main reason 
for joining the militia. According to Richard Kessler there were other categories of armed 
civilians under the ICHDF program: special paramilitary forces consisting of former 
rebels and other individuals under the control of politicians, local security guards, 
provincial guards, civilian firearms holders and civilian volunteers (Kawal ng Barangay). 
The police and the army controlled CHDF for counterinsurgency operations. “A CHDF’s 
mission was “village defense,” protecting a local barangay.”102 Lateral coordination 
among military and police commanders and local officials in these areas were the basis of 
deployment and utilization of militias. The governors and mayors had strong influence 
over the utilization of militias. 
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E. OTHER ANTI- COMMUNIST VIGILANTES  
“The Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights also reported that vigilantes 
regularly performed police and military activities such as patrols, manning of checkpoints 
and search and seizure operations.”103 However, the vigilantism in Mindanao particularly 
in Davao City, the anti- communist vigilantes called Alsa Masa was organized by the 
police and was successful against the NPA. General Fidel Ramos, the former Chief of 
Staff identified the Alsa Masa as deserving the full support and encouragement in 
dismantling communism.104 Similarly, the Fuerza Masa in Leyte was also successful 
against the illegal armed groups and the NPA. 
F. CHDF BECAME AN ABUSIVE AND INEFFECTIVE FORCE 
The militia detachments had been a good source of weapons and ammunitions for 
the insurgency. The CHDF members were ill trained, unequipped and incapable of 
performing the function of village defense. Some militia units until today are a good 
source of NPA weapons and ammunition. “Frequently, CHDF forces will throw their 
arms and flee when challenged by the NPA.”105 Militia detachments had weak defenses 
against NPA attacks as well as being weak in command and control. Poor cadre 
leadership was one factor.   
Many claimed the CHDF became private armies of some local officials engaged 
in illegal and violent activities.  
The CHDF was a total disaster. They were untrained, undisciplined, and 
unpaid- but armed- which was a sure- fire formula for corruption and 
abuse of their helpless victims. They were the primary source of all stories 
of abduction, salvaging, and torture that gave the military its bad name. 
They were the main reason why the government lost out in its choice was 
a matter of life and death.106 
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It was during this period when the CHDF were allegedly engaged in a wide- range 
of violent and coercive activities victimizing the civilian populace whom they were 
supposed to protect from insurgents atrocities.  
They were notorious for stealing rice and chicken, for forcing peasants to 
bring them food and beers, dig their holes, and supply them with women. 
At checkpoints on highways or rural roads slightly drunk personnel would 
extort money, pull off kidnappings and torture- or even execute- suspected 
informers for the NPA.107 
Militias were more abusive than the insurgents where civilians were directly the 
victims of extortion and human rights abuses. Paret and Shy argued, “once a substantial 
number of members of a community commit violence on behalf of the government, they 
have gone far to break permanently the tie between that community and the 
guerrillas.”108 It was not surprising that the people sided with the insurgents for their own 
protection from abusive militias. Many people questioned the ability of the government 
to protect them from lawlessness and abuse of militias. Many could not distinguish the 
regular soldiers from militia because abuses were prevalent even in areas not influenced 
by insurgents. 
Recruitment and screening of militias are factors that contribute to the problem of 
abusive and notorious militias. Most were relatives and friends of local officials who 
were unemployed and their interest were purely personal. Local officials used their own 
people for their protection and the protection of their businesses or private properties. 
Their loyalty was to the local officials and not to the service. Militias were supervised by 
a handful of regular enlisted personnel, who in the long-run, established a bond 
detrimental to the military organization. Extortion became a means of support for the 
militia detachments because of the little support received from the higher headquarters. 
The military cadres were untrained for the job. The Internal Security Operations 
assessment report revealed a need to reorganize and improve the control and supervision 
of the CHDF.109 
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G. CONCLUSION 
The AFP recommended the deactivation of the CHDF because of its 
ineffectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. The lack of control and training of the 
militias contributed immensely to the growing insurgency situation. The primary aim of 
organizing paramilitary forces becomes counter productive to its intended purpose of 
protecting the civilians from the insurgents’ atrocities. Civilians opted to side with the 
insurgents rather than the military and paramilitary forces because of fear and abuses 
committed by CHDF members. The CHDF became more a liability force than an 
effective deterrent against the insurgents’ acts of violence and extortion activities. 
Civilians could hardly distinguished CHDF members from the NPA insurgents. Both 
were involved in extortion but the CHDF was more abusive.    
Executive Order 275 was issued on July 15, 1987, which set the gradual and 
orderly dissolution of all paramilitary units and the conversion of its budgetary 
appropriations into the Citizen Armed Force Program. 
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IV. CIVILIAN ARMED FORCE GEOGRAPHICAL UNIT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the deactivation of the CHDF, the President of the Philippines signed 
Executive Order 264 on 25 July 1987 for the creation of the Citizen Armed Force 
Geographical Units Active Auxiliaries composed of all reservists organized into 
geographical units. Reservists and qualified volunteers are recruited to render military 
active auxiliary duty, whose purpose was to attain the desired manpower level in the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines to confront the growing insurgency and other threat 
groups effectively without overburdening the government budget. The government 
expanded the role of the Citizen Armed Force.   
The U.S. Department assessment report in November 1985 stressed that the key 
issues within the AFP that needed to be addressed were accountability for corruption, 
upward mobility and effective leadership. The U.S Department report also emphasized 
reform of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) for the counterinsurgency 
campaign.110 That paramilitary unit could be effective as a counterinsurgency force. 
According to Michael McClintock, “paramilitary irregulars being drawn from the local 
population itself are generally more familiar with the local scene than are conventional 
forces, and thus capable of more effective local operations.”111  
The abuses of vigilantes would end with the organization of highly trained and 
disciplined paramilitary forces. The testimony before the House Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee made by David Lambertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, “stated that CAFGU was formed in part to stop the abuses 
attributed to “vigilante” groups and that it would have a “more formal relationships” with 
the military than the latter had.”112 
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B. ORGANIZATION OF CIVILIAN ARMED FORCE GEOGRAPHICAL 
UNITS ACTIVE AUXILIARIES 
The Department of National Defense issued the implementing rules and 
regulations for the organization of the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units Active 
Auxiliaries (CAA) throughout the country. The primary objective was to complement the 
operations of the AFP.     
In 1995, the primary responsibility for Internal Security Operations (ISO) was 
transferred from the Philippine National Police (PNP) back to the AFP, effectively giving 
the AFP the lead role in internal security and in territorial defense operations. The 
prevailing security threats called for the immediate realignment of forces, adjustments of 
operational/- tactical boundaries of units, and the administrative supervision of the 
CAFGU Active Auxiliaries was transferred from the Area Commands to the Major 
Service Commands to ensure an effective and efficient program.113   
The CAA consisting of volunteer- reservists and citizen- volunteers is called upon 
to render active auxiliary service. Their primary mission is the defense of their localities. 
The State Department report to the House Appropriations Committee entitled -Citizens’ 
Self Defense Groups in the Philippines included the following characteristics of CAFGU: 
screening of recruits in consultation with civilian officials and rejection of abusive or 
criminal elements; human rights and values training; deployment in the community from 
which the recruits are drawn; and careful supervision by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines.114 The restructured CAA is different from the earlier paramilitary units such 
as the BSDU and the CHDF that were criticized for being abusive and corrupt.  
The members of the active CAFGU were full time militia who were 
recruited and based in their home areas, where they were charged with 
defending against insurgent attacks. CAFGU companies were trained and 
commanded by active officers and NCOs of the army and constabulary. If 
mobilized, the militias were to become part of their sponsoring active 
army or constabulary unit. The 720 CAFGU active auxiliary companies 
had around 64,000 members in 1990.115 
                                                 
113 Letter of Instruction 20/01 (Tangol- Bayan Charlie) issued on 20 August 2001. 
114 _______, “The Philippines,” Human Rights Watch Publications, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Philippi.htm (June 16, 2004), p. 3. 
115 Ronald E. Dolan, Philippines: A Country Study, 4th ed. (DA pam;550- 72, 1993), p. 271. 
35 
The Philippine Army has 741 CAFGU Active Auxiliary companies with 46,827 
members as of June 2003.116 These CAA units are all under the direct control and 
supervision of the Army.  
The AFP has also activated Special CAAs as additional territorial forces aimed at 
securing private companies found in areas frequently visited by the communist 
insurgents. The firms provide the budget requirements of SCAA for protecting them from 
progressive taxation and harassment by the insurgents. SCAA utilization is primarily for 
the security and interest of the business company financing it. The local government units 
were also allowed to activate SCAA through the Peace and Order Council (POC) because 
of the intensified activities of the CPP/NPA. The AFP provides firearms and ammunition 
and supervising personnel. Both the regular CAA and Special CAA are under the 
command and control of military units.  
1. Concepts of the Program 
The AFP has identified that screening and selection of volunteers is important to 
have an effective CAA program. The Major Service Commands are responsible for the 
selection process in consultation with the Peace and Order Councils (POC).117 In cases of 
conflict with the POC, the decision of the Major Service Commander shall prevail. The 
screening and selection, appointment and reappointment, payment, arming, equipping, 
accounting and other administrative matters are the primary responsibility of the Major 
Service Commander, while the operational control of all CAA/SCAA units is the primary 
responsibility of Area Commanders.  
An appropriate number of cadres composed of officers and enlisted personnel of 
the AFP regular force will be assigned to handle the CAA/SCAA units to ensure effective 
command and control. The organization was patterned after the Army’s regular rifle 
company, platoons and squads organization. One full-size CAA Company is organized 
into three CAA/SCAA rifle platoons and one headquarters platoon. The authorized 
strength of one company consists of one officer, 12 enlisted personnel and 88 CAA 
members. (See Appendix A) Generally, CAA units are handled and supervised by 
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responsible enlisted personnel only. The Battalion operations officer (S3) is usually 
designated as the CAA officer for all CAA units under the control and supervision of the 
Battalion.  CAA units are deployed in a manner that the normal livelihood activities of 
members are not impaired. CAA members perform paramilitary duties for a certain 
number of days a week so that on other days they can also attend to their livelihood 
activities such as tilling their lands because most of them are farmers and low income 
earners from the rural areas.  It is necessary for the CAA members to attend to their 
primary source of revenue. The number of days for duty is still determined on a case-by-
case basis, which is largely based on the security situation in the area. 
All CAA are subject to military laws and the Articles of War. The purpose was to 
treat them like regular forces covered by military regulations. The CAA members have 
specific duties to perform and subjecting them to military laws will make them more 
responsible members of the government’s paramilitary units and the community they 
serve. The military has instituted reforms in the administration and operational control of 
all paramilitary units. Military commanders can easily weed out any CAA member who 
violates human rights and tarnishes the image of the AFP.            
Finally, one important provision in implementing the rules and regulations to EO 
264 was that once the situation in the area has returned to normal based upon the 
assessment of Area Commander, the CAA unit in the area can be deactivated.  
2. Incentives for CAA 
CAA members receive the monthly stipend or allowance, educational benefit for 
qualified dependents, combat clothing and individual equipment, hospitalization and 
medical care, disability benefits, death benefits and they are now entitled to separation 
gratuity pay. (See Appendix B) The monthly stipend or the subsistence allowance is 
equivalent to the subsistence allowance of regular Army soldiers, which is now Php60.00 
per day. 
The monthly stipend or allowance of the SCAA is shouldered by the business 
establishment and the Local Government Units (LGU). They also receive educational  
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benefits, hospitalization and medical care, disability benefits, death benefits and burial 
assistance from the business firms and LGU.  The AFP provides military burial benefits 
to SCAA members   
3. Mission of CAA 
The primary mission is to support the AFP in the protection of life and property, 
security of vital facilities and public utilities and to assist the local government authorities 
in the delivery of services in their respective communities specifically during local 
emergency. 
C. AFP STRATEGIES 
The desired end state is for the CPP/NPA and the other major security threats to 
ultimately accept peace under the government’s terms. The AFP has developed and used 
different strategies in order to achieve the end state. The strategies include a holistic 
approach, win-hold-win approach, sustained operations and the “Lambat-Bitag” (Net 
Trap) strategic precepts.118   
1. Holistic Approach 
The strategy of holistic approach is the national strategy that possesses the 
political, socio- economic and psycho- social and security components in addressing the 
three main internal security threats, which are the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, the local 
communist movement called CPP, and the Southern Philippines Secessionist groups or 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The AFP and PNP combined will defeat the 
armed components of these threats in order for the other government agencies to proceed 
with the socio- economic development and address the  causes of insurgency. 
2. Win-Hold-Win Strategy 
The win- hold- win strategy means focusing of combat power against identified 
threat groups while the economy of force is on lower priority threats. Of the 106 guerrilla 
fronts only 14 are categorized as very active fronts of the CPP/NPA. The AFP’s combat 
power is focused on these active fronts with fewer forces focused on the less active 
fronts. After winning the targeted active fronts, combat power will be shifted to the next 
targeted fronts. The strategy involves risks in lower priority threat areas.  The AFP’s 
shifting of forces depends on the national priority concerns. 
                                                 
118 AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (Bantay- Laya) dated 01 January 2002. 
38 
3. Strategy of Sustained Operations 
The various Area Command campaigns are launched against the CPP/NPA fronts 
without cease until these insurgent fronts are decisively defeated. The Area Commands 
are primarily addressing different priority guerrilla fronts using the general operational 
concept of one infantry brigade against one guerrilla front. 
D. ROLE OF CAA IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN 
The primary objective of CAA was village defense in order to prevent the re- 
entry of insurgents into the villages. It protects the people and secures the villages from 
the atrocities and forced taxation of the insurgents. The CAA performs security duty of 
vital facilities and installations and defends the villages from insurgents’ attacks. The 
CAA provides limited support to the AFP offensive operations, security for the rear area 
and main supply route and base defense operations. The CAA undergoes the basic 
military training with emphasis on village defense and respect for human rights. The 
other objectives of the basic military training include military courtesy and discipline, 
and to develop physically fit and people- oriented CAA and effective components of the 
AFP in internal security operations. (See Appendix C). Civil relations and value 
formation are also taught to new CAA members. They are given training on individual 
skills, weapons proficiency, and small unit operations. Practical applications are being 
done before they are deployed and utilized for village defense. A disciplined and trained 
paramilitary can be an effective deterrent force against insurgent attacks as well as, 
providing a safe environment for development in rural areas.  Government agencies such 
as the Departments of Health, Education, Social Welfare and other government services 
can reach the rural areas for their programmed development activities without feeling 
insecure. 
According to Michael McClintock, “counter- insurgency is to proceed through a 
sequence of preparatory, clearing and holding phases.”119 Enactment of emergency 
legislation, registration of civil population with the military and identity card system, 
training of police and military units, and organization and training of paramilitary forces 
were part of the preparatory phase. The paramilitary forces whenever possible composed 
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of former military and police personnel.120 The clear phase calls for offensive actions by 
conventional forces to clear insurgents from specific area. Conventional forces 
collaborate with the armed militias to eliminate the insurgent forces.121 The holding 
phase involves “the armed local irregulars are to be institutionalized with communication 
links directly to central authorities.”122 The armed irregulars would continue to assist the 
conventional forces in information and intelligence gathering. 
The clear, hold, consolidate and develop methodology against the CPP/NPA was 
adopted by the government and the military establishment in order to execute planned, 
coordinated and integrated efforts of the AFP, other government agencies, the people and 
the civil society. The clear stage involves sustained security operations against the 
insurgent armed groups and neutralization of the CPP’s politico-military infrastructures. 
The CPP/NPA has exerted influence even in previously cleared areas, increased agitation 
propaganda activities, coerced local candidates to pay campaign fees and established 
additional guerrilla fronts. The task of clearing insurgent infested areas was the primary 
responsibility of Army battalions with the support of the police mobile forces.  
The hold stage involves the CAA in providing security and defense of the villages 
against the re-entry or incursions of the insurgent armed groups. The participation of the 
CAA in this stage is important because it disassociates the civilian populace from the 
insurgents and cuts off the insurgents’ mass base support. The insurgents are denied 
access to the people and prevented from securing intelligence and foodstuff and other 
supplies. Protection of the population and physical and psychological separation of the 
insurgents from the population are important elements in the integration of military and 
civilian programs in counterinsurgency.123 
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The consolidate stage involves the military, the police, the civilian government 
agencies and the people to strengthen government control and authority in cleared areas. 
Cleared areas as defined by the AFP are areas categorized free of insurgents’ influence 
and control. 
The hold and consolidate stages are the responsibilities of the territorial forces:-
the CAA and police units. The CAA units play an important role in the physical security 
and protection of the populace and properties against any insurgent attacks. The AFP has 
effectively operational zed the Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS) in order to 
put an end to the cycle of NPA returning to areas previously cleared by the military. 
ITDS was established in all identified AFP controlled areas after the clearing operations 
to prevent insurgents from re-influencing the areas. It is a strategy of harnessing the 
efforts of territorial forces and local populace into a defense and security system that will 
secure and insulate the locality from enemy influence, incursion or re- entry. CAA units, 
civilian volunteer organizations (CVO), and other anti-communist base organizations are 
employed and integrated for defense against insurgent attacks. The police conduct law 
enforcement operations and provide augmentation support to the territorial forces.     
Finally, the develop stage involves the implementation of the government’s socio-
economic, psychological and political reforms in order to address the root causes of 
insurgency:-poverty and injustice.  Balanced development includes political, social and 
economic programs and mobilization of popular support for the government are major 
elements in counterinsurgency.124 
E. CPP’S THREE-YEAR PROGRAM 
The CPP’s three-year program was to advance the people’s war and to intensify 
its tactical offensives against the AFP, PNP and all CAA units in order to acquire 
additional firearms and ammunitions. The NPA will conduct more daring raids similar to 
the PICOP incident in order to acquire more firearms to sustain their armed struggle. The 
AFP lost 108 high-powered firearms during the NPA raid at the PICOP CAA detachment 
in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Other major operational setbacks involved CAA patrol bases  
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in Eastern Samar, Misamis Oriental, Agusan Sur, Capiz and Bukidnon where government 
troops suffered 26 soldiers killed and lost 52 high-powered firearms for short period of 
six months in 2003.  
The annual average rate of increase of NPA’s firearms was 1% from 1995 to 
2001. The estimate is broken into 4,819 high-powered and 1,314 low-powered 
firearms.125 The CPP/NPA had been monitored and they generated about P94M in 2003 
or a 40% increase compared to P67M in 2002 extortion activities. The CPP/NPA 
exploited the election period to increase their extortion activities. The communist 
insurgents conducted 57 arson operations against business companies destroying 
properties worth P138M. Most of the incidents were conducted against 
telecommunication facilities located in far- flung areas and less protected by government 
troops. Reports also indicated that the CPP/NPA was demanding firearms, ammunitions 
and military supplies as part of their extortion demands. 
The mass protest activities initiated by the communist front organizations also 
increased by 18% compared to the 2002 figures, and 31% of the total 961 mass protest 
activities were done in the National Capital Region (NCR). Multi-sectoral groups, labor, 
student and youth and peasant sectors capitalized on social, economic and political issues 
that mobilized the masses. The average number of mass action participants also increased 
by 12 % compared to 2002 data.    
Overall, the CPP/NPA has increased guerrilla operations against poorly defended 
military and CAA detachments, mass protest rallies, extortion activities and the rising 
trend in the number of guerrilla fronts. Since 1995, the average rate of increase of 
guerrilla front expansion was 11%. The total guerrilla fronts at present is 106 fronts but 
only 14 are categorized as very active and the advanced fronts distributed as follows: six 
in Luzon, three in Visayas and five in Mindanao. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The restructured, retrained and supervised CAA units strengthen the village 
defense of several communities against insurgents’ attacks. More CAA units were 
activated in mostly insurgent influenced areas in order to prevent the insurgents’ 
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expansion and recruitment activities. The CAA members are believed to be more 
dedicated and committed to their job of protecting the people and the community they 
serve. The CAA has been the cutting edge in the maintenance of peace and security in 
areas where the presence of regular troops are rarely felt.   
The increasing trend of the CPP/NPA in affected areas indicates their relentless 
mass organizing efforts not only in the far- flung areas but also in the urban centers. The 
insurgents had intensified its offensives against poorly manned military and CAA 
detachments to acquire additional firearms and exploited the election period to increase 
their extortion activities to sustain the movement.  
The AFP has recognized that there is still a need to improve the utilization of 
CAA further, particularly in remote areas with less command and control from military 
units. Recent operational lapses were committed by mostly CAA detachments during 
insurgents’ surprised attacks and some of these incidents were considered major debacles 
due to the large number of government casualties and loss of military equipment. The 
most important lesson learned from these incidents was the poorly manned detachments, 
which resulted in the killing or wounding of military cadres and CAA members, and 
sometimes capture by insurgents. Several firearms and military equipment were lost and 
in some cases, the civilian populace was reported as casualties of cross fires. 
From the operational standpoint, the maneuver battalion’s combat effectiveness in 
counterinsurgency operations is drastically reduced due to the administration of CAA. 
The campaign strategy demands focusing the maximum combat power of maneuver 
battalions against identified threat groups while economy of force to lower priority 
threats.  The strategy requires maneuver battalions to be 100% combat effective primarily 
to clear its area of guerrilla fronts within a specific time frame. The maneuver battalions 
are combat effective if personnel and equipment are available for combat operations. 
However, the present arrangement causes maneuver battalions to be concerned both with 
the ISO campaign and administration of all CAA units in their area of responsibility. The 
CAA administration requires a number of personnel and equipment in order to control, 
supervise and administer effectively and prevent them from being overrun by insurgents. 
The CAA administration becomes a major concern of unit commanders because it is 
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becoming targets of insurgent attacks. The problem is compounded by the fact that most 
infantry battalions deployed for ISO are about 80% filled or an average of 15 officers and 
400 enlisted personnel only. One company dedicated for CAA administration results in a 
great reduction in the combat efficiency of a battalion.  
The evaluation of the deployment of CAA also indicates that there were some 
serious violations of the standard operating procedures (SOP), poor networking, and fast 
turn-over of units handling the CAA. Some detachments overrun by insurgents were 
manned by a few CAA members and commanded by one or two cadres which are 
violations of the existing directive that a detachment must be at least a platoon sized 
detachment. No reinforcements from the nearest detachment arrived because of not being 
able to communicate. The CAA detachments possessed weak defenses and a weak 
leadership ability of cadres. These weaknesses need to be addressed to use the CAA 
effectively as force multipliers and protectors of the communities, and more importantly, 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED FOR UTILIZING THE PARAMILITARY 
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The overthrow of the government through armed struggle remains the main 
objective of the Communist movement in the Philippines. According to Professor Jose 
Ma Sison, founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines,  
two governments exist in the Philippines. One is the nationwide 
revolutionary government of workers and peasants based in the 
countryside. The other is the counterrevolutionary government of big 
compradors and landlords centered in Manila.126   
In 1986, the Communist insurgency had actually grown from an irritant into a 
threat to national existence.127 The Communists had established a “shadow government” 
and had continuously expanded its influence in several areas of Central Luzon. The 
country, faced with increasing Communist guerrilla fronts from a small group of 
disgruntled peasants, clearly indicated that Communism has grown into a serious security 
threat. The former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile had raised concerns over the 
CPP/NPA’s attacks by battalion-size forces in the Bicol region.128 This raised a question 
about the future of the Philippine national security because of the growing insurgency 
condition in the country: 
How could 500 armed rebels move freely in an area like Bicol? Did the 
military not receive any intelligence report on the movement of this armed 
group? If they did, why did they not act to stop rebel operations? Or can 
500 armed rebels now move freely among the people because they are 
now enjoying the support of the people in the area?129 
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General Fidel V. Ramos, on December 31, 1987, had emphasized, in a review of 
the security situation that the CPP and its NPA fighting arm remained the nation’s “No. 1 
threat”.130 The CPP/NPA still remains a major security threat to the Philippine 
government and its people.  
It was actually in the mid-1980’s that the escalating Communist insurgency had 
affected the prospects for stability in the Philippines. The State Department assessment in 
November 1985 presented by Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, stated that the Philippine armed forces need an effective and strong 
military to combat the growing Communist insurgency. The deficiencies in the armed 
forces cited the problems of leadership, upward mobility and accountability for 
corruption and abuse of authority. The CHDF was also necessary to reform the 
counterinsurgency campaign.131 
The Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency defines insurgency, which states: 
Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward 
completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the 
use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. 
Insurgent  activity- including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political 
mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party 
organization, and international activity- is designed to weaken government 
control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. 
The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to 
control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups 
from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the 
creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area 
or country.132   
The Philippine Defense Department had noted that the Communist insurgency 
was becoming the major threat to the country and the efforts to revitalize the armed 
forces against this threat had failed. The NPA’s urban assassination squad, the so called 
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), had been responsible for gunning down more than 100 
military and civilian “people’s enemies”133. At about the same time, the Defense 
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Department had resorted to allowing vigilantism and listed a set of guidelines for 
vigilante formation and activity. The purpose was to prevent the Communists from 
harassing and coercing the populace. Anti communists and Civilian Volunteer 
Organizations (CVO) were formed and organized. As Paret and Shy had asserted, “the 
great weakness of the mobile striking forces-imperfect tactical intelligence- is better 
corrected by the creation of local militia.”134 The Department of National Defense’s 
directive had emphasized “those volunteer groups could not meddle with government 
functions nor act as “private armies” of political organizations or of the rich and 
powerful.”135 
According to the Asian Human Rights Commission, the government’s 
encouragement of the vigilantes and its total war policy against the Communists was 
turning the whole country into a battlefield and “pitting civilian against civilian”. The 
Commission cited the human rights violations in Kidapawan and Davao in Mindanao and 
also in Cebu and in other areas in the Visayas. A similar report made by the London-
based Amnesty International stated that the human rights violations committed by the 
regular military and the paramilitary civil defense forces were being condoned by 
government authorities in their counterinsurgency campaign.136 These allegations were 
fabrications or exploitations against the armed forces. As one experienced observer 
summarizes the point:137 
Every insurgency…requires a cause. [But] there is always some issue 
which has an appeal to each section of the community, and, even if 
dormant, an inspired incident may easily revive it in an acute form…All 
governments are vulnerable to criticism, and every grievance, shortcoming 
or abuse will be exploited. 
The former president Corazon Aquino gave the armed forces a free hand in the 
conduct of an all out war against the Communists because of the incessant NPA attacks 
in the countryside. All out war means conduct of extensive combat operations against the  
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Communists and that such operations must ensure the protection and security of the 
people. The general headquarters issued a set of operational guidelines as well as the 
rules of engagement to be adhered to in the course of the operations. 
According to David Kowalewski, “Fighting revolutionary deviance with counter- 
revolutionary paramilitary deviance seems counterproductive.”138 Kowalewski contends 
paramilitarism encourages political deviance. The civilian populace would perceive 
paramilitary as being unconstitutional and engaging in illegal behaviors. The paramilitary 
units should be perceived as providing order against deviance and not as provoking 
further deviance.139 
The economic reason why governments would like to train paramilitary forces is 
the cheaper cost rather than training regular people in the armed forces. Paramilitary 
forces do not receive the same benefits as regular military personnel.140 The cost of one 
paramilitary member is Php30, 000.00 while a new recruit of the armed forces with the 
rank of private is Php199, 000.00. The initial cost includes only the basic pay and 
allowances. Other incentives such as longevity pay and retirement benefits are provided 
to regular soldiers but not to paramilitary members. The cost of recruiting and 
maintaining paramilitary is much cheaper. 
B.  COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CHDF AND THE CAA 
1. Civilian Home Defense Force (1974- 1987) 
The CHDF was categorized as part time soldiers who received a monthly salary 
of Php200 and a 9,000 peso insurance policy. The CHDF members were recruited in the 
villages of the countryside for village defense. There were 50,000 armed CHDF members 
in 1985.141 The CHDF was a cheap alternative to regular Army units. The plan was to 
utilize the CHDF to gather intelligence, and at the same time, provide a certain level of 
physical security to the populace. However, Richard J. Kessler claimed that the CHDFs 
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“were ill trained, unequipped and incapable of performing that function adequately.”142 A 
similar analysis in the special report made by the Asia Society on the assessment of the 
prospects for the Philippines stated that the Philippine armed forces turned to a short-term 
stratagem, which was the creation of a Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) of 
underpaid, under-trained, armed units recruited in the villages of the countryside for 
village defense.143 Kessler further argues that the Constabulary controls the CHDF 
theoretically but is actually under the army’s direction or that of the political figures.  
The author would argue that the CHDF was organized based on what the military 
and police units had perceived was important at that time and that the creation of 
paramilitary forces would enhance not only the manpower requirement but more the 
capability to assist the armed forces in fighting against the growing communist 
insurgency. However, when the CHDFs were organized, there was no clear guidance on 
the utilization of these militia units. The control and administration were not properly 
defined as well as who would be responsible for their administration and operational 
activities. The control of these militias became a problem for the armed forces.  
“If the paramilitary organizations are left to fight semi- independently, under 
charismatic leaders, there is a tendency for them to backfire on their organizers.”144 
McClintock cited the incident on May 1958 when the 3,300 strong “South Algerian 
Commandos” revolted against the French where only 300 men remained loyal to them. 
McClintock argues close military and political supervision of the paramilitary units must 
be maintained.145 The military institutions in Guatemala and El Salvador had bad 
experiences on armed civilian organizations and they had reinforced their internal 
institutional control on the new irregular paramilitary forces. 
According to Peter Paget and John W. Shy, “the ultimate technique in isolating 
the guerrillas from the people is to persuade the people to defend themselves.”146 The 
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people could form militia-type local defense units to help defeat the guerrillas. “They 
protect their communities, ambush raiders, and furnish intelligence and security to mobile 
forces in the vicinity.”147 The Philippine militia was intended for the same purpose and 
intention but the CHDF failed not only to isolate the guerrillas from the people but also 
failed to protect the communities from insurgents’ attacks and coercive actions. “The 
problem of unprotected villages is a real one, and whatever the level of the regular armed 
forces might be, the problem cannot be avoided.”148 The Communist insurgency 
continued to grow and to expand their influence. The failure of the CHDF is caused by 
several factors such as poor leadership of cadres, low pay, poor quality of militia 
members, poor training, poor control, abuse of authority and many people accused the 
elected local leaders of somehow causing the CHDF’s failure. 
What is the role of the elected officials or leaders as far as the CHDFs are 
concerned? The CHDF was seen by the people as an arm of the local government. Local 
leaders in the 1970’s had a free hand to utilize the militias even for personal reasons 
because it did not prohibit them from doing whatever they pleased. Some local politicians 
utilized the CHDF members as their personal bodyguards and security during the 
electoral process. Many people claimed that militias resorted to extortion and abuse of 
power because they had the backing and protection of local “warlords”. A number of 
cases proved that militias were used for illegal activities by powerful individuals in the 
localities. “Paramilitary groups tend to reflect the interests and prejudices of the ruling 
political and economic powers.”149 The armed forces failed to set the guidelines and 
operational directives that clearly defined the roles and functions of the militias. There 
were no consultations with the local leaders in the areas where they were recruited that 
made them ineffective. These militias were effectively utilized as the paramilitary forces 
against the people and not against the Communist insurgents.  
Another reason for failure was that the armed forces’ insurgency campaign 
strategy did not define the exact role and disposition of CHDF. These paramilitary units 
were organized and armed but the role on how to secure the villages was not clearly 
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stated during its inception. Even the CHDF members were not aware of their role in the 
governments’ counterinsurgency effort, much less of their disposition and relations with 
the local officials, local police and other local civilian volunteer organizations (CVOs).  
The command relationships of the CHDFs with the regular army and police units 
operating in the area were serious problems that caused grave consequences-mistaken 
encounters. One major problem also identified with the CHDF was the command and 
control aspect. The police and the army had different methods of handling and controlling 
the militias. There was no clear mandate on how militias were to be administered and 
operationally handled. Loyalty is to those who lead and control them. Militias were led 
by a few enlisted personnel with basically no training on how to handle the CHDF. It 
turned out that the CHDF was mishandled and abused in terms of utilization and purpose 
and not used as conceptualized. 
Another weakness of utilizing the CHDF in counterinsurgency operations was 
that its organization was not designed for combat operations. Many operational lapses 
were caused by improper utilization of paramilitary forces. It should be clear that the 
CHDF’s were local defense units primarily aimed at protecting the communities and not 
conducting long-range patrols to look for the Communist insurgents. Another cause of 
failure was that the CHDF units lacked the necessary firepower and communication 
equipment aside from the little training on village defense they received from their 
cadres. The CHDF detachments were being overrun by insurgent attacks because of a 
lack of training. It was an accepted fact that at that time the CHDF was not a top priority 
agenda item of the armed forces in terms of training, arming and providing the 
operational equipment support. The armed forces were partly to blame for the failure of 
the previously organized militias.    
Combating the communist’s guerrillas is both the concern of the political and 
military leaders. The Communist insurgency requires a political response as well as a 
military response.150 This was probably not clear to many political leaders, and 
particularly to the local leaders, that allowed the CHDF to be utilized for abusive and 
illegal acts. The problems of the CHDF are the problems of the local government. 
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According to a report of a study mission to the Philippines, many of the abuses of the 
civilian population were committed by the CHDF units.151 These abuses caused severe 
damage to the armed forces. Instead of utilizing the paramilitary forces to protect the 
communities, it prolonged the Communist insurgency, lost the confidence of the people 
in their armed forces, and lost the hearts and minds of the local populace.  
Andrew Scott argues, “a government’s effort to improve its relations with the 
people can be easily undermined if the army behaves in a harsh and arrogant way.”152 
The abusive behavior of the CHDF was a reflection of the entire armed forces and the 
CHDF was part of it. The government has to broaden its base of popular support in any 
campaign. If the officers and men can show compassion for the people while engaging in 
combat near villages and can be careful and helpful, this can be an important factor in 
improving the relations between the government and people.153 However, CHDF units 
were viewed by both local and international communities, and particularly by the human 
rights organizations, as abusive and corrupt. The CHDF lost the confidence of the people 
and it was apparent that losing the people’s support would no longer make the CHDF an 
effective counterinsurgency force. The government was pressured to deactivate and 
disband the CHDF and the other illegal armed groups. 
2.  Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units Active Auxiliary (1987 - to 
Present)     
a. Internal Security Threats 
The Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) 
was established on July 25, 1987 to support the AFP in the counterinsurgency campaign 
against internal security threats. The Philippines is presently facing the following internal 
security threats such as terrorist groups, the Local Communist Movement or the 
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and the Southern 
Philippine Secessionist Groups (SPSG).  
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With the existing security threats, the Philippine government and the 
armed forces fully assessed that the government militias called the CAA are an essential 
component in its counterinsurgency campaign. At present, there are 741 CAA companies 
with 46,827 members, all under the direct control and supervision of the Philippine 
Army. These CAA companies are deployed nationwide and are distributed into the five 
Area Commands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.154  
A Letter of Instruction 20/01 dated August 20, 2001 was issued redefining 
the transfer of the administrative supervision of all CAA from the Area Commands to the 
Major Service Commands to ensure a more efficient and effective CAA Program.155 The 
LOI places the Philippine Army headquarters in charge of the administration of the CAA 
in the selection, appointment and reappointment, payment, arming, equipping, accounting 
and other administrative matters.  
b. Major Role and Tasks of CAA 
The AFP is the lead agency in maintaining security in all areas affected by 
insurgency. The AFP has integrated the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the CAA in 
harnessing the territorial forces in order to secure and insulate the community from 
Communist influence, incursion or re-entry. The communities are considered safe havens 
of the Communist movement. Safe havens or sanctuaries are essential to the success of 
any guerrilla movement. “It serves as staging area from which to mount attacks; and, in 
some cases, function as an additional base for recruitment, training, dissemination of 
propaganda and contact with the outside world.”156 Economically, these base areas can 
funnel resources to the movement.157 To deny the use of these sanctuaries or base areas is 
the primary concern of the government militias. Denying the base areas would mean 
denying the resources to the insurgents. Base areas under the insurgents’ control can 
erode popular support for the incumbent regime.158 
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The author would argue that the AFP has recognized the importance of 
separating the Communist guerrilla from the populace through the use of territorial 
forces. The Communist insurgents are separated from their popular base or sanctuaries. 
As Paret and Shy have clearly indicated, one of the major tasks of counter-guerrilla 
action is the separation of the guerrilla from the population.159 The scheme was effective 
during the Malay campaign (1948-1960). The Home Guard isolated the population both 
physically and mentally from the guerrillas and the effort was reinforced by increased 
police patrols in the villages and rubber plantations.160 Both the Home Guard and the 
police had extensive drive against extortion and intimidation to win the confidence of the 
people. The CAA companies and the local police must be involved in a similar drive to 
win the confidence of the people.  
The LOI 20/01 mentioned the mission of CAA, organization, training, 
deployment guidelines, command relationships, and disposition as well as CAA benefits 
and allowances. The AFP’s commitment to utilize the CAA to support the AFP units in 
its counterinsurgency efforts was well established. The CAA will be utilized primarily for 
the defense of the community in support of the AFP operations. CAA units are tasked to 
secure vital facilities and public utilities, intelligence collection, public information drive 
and community development activities. The author would argue that these CAA tasks are 
clearer and understood by CAA members, police and military commanders in the area 
and including the role and participation of elected public officials. The CAA members are 
now well informed of their duties and responsibilities to the people and communities they 
serve.  
The plan was similar to the “Briggs Plan” applied to Malaya in 1948. The 
plan was initiated by Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs while he was the Director of 
Operations in Malaya. It was a Master Plan for winning the campaign and has four main 
objectives:161   
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• To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete 
security, which would in time, result in a steady and increasing flow of 
information coming from all sources. 
• To break up the Communist organizations within the populated areas. 
• To isolate the bandits from their food and supply organizations in the 
populated areas. 
• To destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the Security Forces on 
their own ground. 
c. Major Lessons Learned   
(1) Combat Effectiveness.  At present, the Infantry or Special 
Forces battalions are the holding units in charge of the administrative and operational 
activities of all CAA units. These regular units provide the military cadres to the CAA 
companies based on the approved CAA organization and manning (See Appendix A). 
Due to this organizational set- up, the security forces tasked to conduct internal security 
operations against the Communist insurgents operate in reduced strength and capability.  
An infantry battalion of approximately 500 men is a mobile force 
deployed in insurgent affected area with an average of about 6 to 8 CAA companies and 
each company requires at least 12 to 14 personnel as cadres. In the Philippine campaign 
strategy, the combat units are the infantry battalions with corresponding combat support 
and combat service support units in a pre-designated Area of Responsibility (AOR). The 
battalions have two main responsibilities: as holding forces in charge of the 
administration of territorial CAA units and as security forces tasked to conduct internal 
security operations. Operationally, a battalion can operate with only two ready companies 
and without any battalion reserve forces because of the administration of territorial CAA 
units. The author, as a result of this situation, would argue that the infantry battalion has 
an operational limitation for combat operations in terms of manpower and capability.  
How can the security forces defeat the Communist insurgents with 
reduced strength and capability? Another question that needs an answer that significantly 
affects the campaign is how can the CAA members perform their tasks as territorial 
forces without placing the administrative burden on infantry battalions? These are major 
problems that need to be addressed by higher headquarters because it affects the combat  
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effectiveness of units and the overall the campaign strategy of defeating the insurgents as 
soon as possible. Combat effectiveness is an essential element in defeating the 
Communist insurgency.  
(2) Importance of Operational Methodology. Over the years,  
the AFP has developed an applicable operational methodology to fight the Communist 
insurgency. It is called the Clear-Hold-Support methodology. This tactic defines the roles 
and functions of the AFP and the different agencies of the government in addressing the 
insurgency problem. In this operational methodology, the mobile forces aim to clear 
insurgency affected areas from armed groups and dismantle the insurgent political-
military structures. The territorial forces secure the cleared areas to allow other 
government agencies for the developmental activities. The clear and hold stages are the 
responsibility of the Department of Defense-AFP and the Department of Interior and 
Local Governments-PNP while the support stage is the responsibility of the civil 
government agencies.  
According to Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, “counter-guerrilla 
warfare is an extremely difficult kind of war to wage- indeed far more so than the 
traditional clash of armies- because the war cannot be won without extensive reforms.”162 
The country’s support stage is actually the developmental efforts of the other agencies of 
the government. The national government felt the need to utilize all government 
instrumentalities for political, social, economic and psychological reforms in order to 
defeat insurgency. 
(3) Unified Commands Relevance. The clear stage requires 
massive security operations against the Communist insurgents by the armed forces and 
the police. “The counter-guerrilla operations in Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, and 
Malaya-have combined close territorial control with mobile striking forces.”163 The 
country was divided into six territories with each placed under the jurisdiction of a 
unified command. This was an excellent tactic with one main purpose: the unity of 
command. The task of a Unified Command is to conduct joint operations in its Area of 
Responsibility in order to establish a peaceful and secured environment and assist the 
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local government agencies in their socio-economic, ecological and developmental 
activities. “The necessary organization must exist to coordinate and implement an 
effective unity of political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral and 
security-stability efforts against those who would violently depose a government.”164 The 
unity of effort is one important component in a counterinsurgency campaign but joint 
operations under one command are operationally essential to defeat the insurgents.  
(4) Modern Technology Relevance.  The armed forces are 
organized and trained to fight the insurgents but the use of modern technology is one 
aspect that the AFP must consider. According to Paret and Shy, the mobile striking forces 
must be well organized and have the best trained regulars to fight unorthodoxly but 
exploit the benefits of modern technology.165 The AFP had acquired some military 
equipment but it was not sufficient to sustain continuous combat operations. 
Sophisticated weaponry and combat equipage such as helicopters and other air assets are 
factors in gaining arms superiority over the insurgents. One long-term typical problem is 
the communication capability of CAA detachments. Many detachments had either World 
War II vintage radios or no radios or any means of communication with the holding units. 
Reinforcements and other means of combat support to detachments being attacked had 
not been made because there was no communication link with the nearest friendly 
detachments. The cost of losses of firearms and other combat equipment was higher than 
providing these much needed communication requirements, not to mention the many 
CAA lives lost due to this lack of communication. 
(5) Consistent Strategies.  One factor that contributes to the  
ability of the AFP to stop insurgency is consistency in strategies. A particular strategy 
may not fit the overall objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign. As Andrew Scott 
has stated, “to decide which strategy or tactic to employ, the counterinsurgent must take 
several things into account: (1) whether he possesses the capabilities needed to employ 
the strategy or tactic; (2) whether its use fits into his over-all political, military and 
psychological objectives; and (3) what benefits are to be realized from its use in relation 
                                                 
164 Max G. Manwaring, “Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response,” Studies in Asymmetry 
(September 2001), p. 24.           
165 Paret and Shy, p. 42. 
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to the cost of its use.”166 Scott also argues that “it is often easy to tell if the first condition 
is met but more difficult to tell if the second condition is satisfied.”167 The example Scott 
presented was the destruction of a village and the killing of some insurgents. The incident 
could be a military success, but psychologically and politically, it was counterproductive. 
The previous search and destroy strategy of the armed forces was proven not effective 
and was a good example of strategy that did not support the political objectives and ran 
counter to the national objective of winning the hearts and minds of the people. The 
principal task of the security forces is to regain the hearts and minds of the populace.168 
The armed forces are more concerned with the aspect of gaining the people’s support to 
assist the government in its counterinsurgency campaign rather than just body counts 
after combat operations. The success of the campaign is measured through winning the 
hearts and minds of the people. 
(6) Importance of Training.  The hold stage prevents the 
guerrilla’s expansion or incursion. The CAA and the local police are tasked to isolate the 
population from the guerrillas. The Communist insurgents are prevented access and entry 
into the community. How to deny the Communists their popular base? The Communists 
must lose their hold over the people and be isolated from them. The author would argue 
that the CAA members could perform these duties of preventing access and entry of 
insurgents into the community if they were trained and properly equipped and led by the 
responsible cadres. Training is one factor that makes the CAA different from the CHDF. 
CAA members are competent, skilled and disciplined paramilitary. “The strength and 
skill of the government forces are the most powerful determinants of an insurgent 
campaign.”169 The basic training makes the CAA members physically fit and people 
oriented auxiliaries and a much better component of the AFP in internal security 
operations. Refresher training is also required for all CAA and military cadres in order 
for the CAA to become a more effective counterinsurgency force.   
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168 Hook and Spanier, p. 125. 
169 John Mackinlay, Globalization and Insurgency, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 33. 
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C.  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN 
The Philippine armed forces has been involved and seriously considered many 
tactical operations strategies to combat the Communist insurgency. Although the AFP has 
not totally defeated the NPA, it has gained the upper hand in its counterinsurgency 
efforts. The CAA program has been successful in many areas by regaining the areas 
previously under the Communist influence. The minds of the people have been won over 
but it is a completely different matter to win their support for the government’s campaign 
against the Communist insurgents. According to John Mackinlay, “the strongest 
governments, and therefore the ones most difficult for the insurgents to operate against, 
are formidable because they have a high degree of popular support and legitimacy, as 
well as being militarily strong.”170 The CAA has played a significant role in this effort to 
win the support of the populace by extending kindness and help to those in need. In the 
Malaya campaign, “Operation Service” was implemented by the Police Force and the 
Home Guards to extend their kindness and assistance to the people in need. It was a 
major contribution to the battle of winning the hearts of the people.171 
The CAA has become an effective counterinsurgency force by preventing the 
expansion of the base areas of the Communist insurgents. These base areas are sources of 
manpower, intelligence and supplies of the insurgents. A base area could be used as a 
training ground or staging area and source of manpower for the Communist movement. 
Andrew Scott argued, the larger and greater the control of these base areas, the greater 
the percentage of the area’s resources that the insurgents could utilize.172 The CAA had 
been successful in making the probable areas of expansion inaccessible to the Communist 
insurgents. 
The CAA detachments adhere to certain Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) in 
order to protect the community and make the people feel secured. The existing 
dispositions of CAA detachments are tactically and strategically defensible from 
insurgent attacks.   
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D.  CONCLUSION 
One writer argues that it would be dangerous for any government to train 
paramilitary forces, because in the long term, the governments are unsure of the future 
loyalties of these paramilitary forces. They may currently be working for the government, 
but as they work and gain skills, these paramilitary forces could use these same skills 
against the government in the future. 
Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces.173 The counter argument 
could be that the paramilitary can be effective counterinsurgency forces as long as they 
are provided with the correct incentives, training to be more competent and disciplined, 
and having good command and control by responsible cadres. Paramilitary forces had 
been organized almost at the same time the Philippine insurgency had reemerged in 1969. 
There was no recorded incident that these militias had used their skills against the 
government. It is accepted that the early local militias did not receive much compensation 
from the government but their coercive and abusive acts were basically due to their 
cadres’ failure to control and administer the militias. It also cannot be denied that it was 
the government’s inability to provide the proper legal sanctions for unauthorized 
utilization of militias that resulted in this situation.  
Adequate training, proper command and control and responsible military cadres 
can make the Philippine paramilitary forces become effective counterinsurgency forces. 
The other important factors such as sufficient incentives, quality of recruits, and 
preparatory training were already addressed and proved useful in transforming the CAA 
into more effective and efficient counterinsurgency forces. The organization of the CAA 
is one of the essential components of the AFP’ Internal Security Operations strategy 
designed to defeat insurgency. The CAA had successfully helped the AFP and other 
governmental agencies to suppress the expansion and growth of insurgency in the 
Philippines. The CAA as well as the military cadres need to undergo continuous refresher 
and proficiency training to become more competent forces and to prevent the CAA from 
becoming targets of opportunity by the CPP/NPA.     
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
For the past 35 years, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been engaged in 
fighting the Communist insurgents. The AFP has utilized different strategic concepts and 
principles and civil military tactics to defeat the major security threat to the Philippine 
government and the Filipino people: the Communist Party of the Philippines and its 
armed wing, the New People’s Army. The search and destroy strategy employed by the 
AFP was proven not to be an effective means of defeating the Communist insurgents. 
The more the AFP uses this type of operational strategy, the more the AFP looses popular 
support because the soldiers committed more human rights violations than accomplishing 
the mission.  
The formal objectives of an insurgency might be arranged along a 
continuum. At one end would be minimum objectives such as minor 
reforms. At the other end would be an objective such as the complete 
reorganization of society. Between the extremes would be objectives such 
as achievement of significant reforms, participation in government, control 
of government, overthrow of the government, and modification of the 
entire political system.174  
The aim of an insurgent movement is to accomplish the goals it has set and it can 
accomplish these goals only if it survives.175 The CPP/NPA has survived the 35-year 
struggle against the Philippine government.  
The AFP shifted its course through civic military operations to regain the popular 
support and at the same time continued to eliminate the Communists operating in the 
countryside and in the villages. It took a lot of effort to regain the people’s support 
because the people had been used to supporting the Communist movement. Civic-
military actions flooded the countryside to regain the people’s support. The government 
and the military tried to convince the people that insurgency did not offer the best option 
for them to progress and be able to live in harmony.  However, the newly created local 
militia-the BSDU, later renamed CHDF did not protect the populace from the 
                                                 
174 Andrew M. Scott et al., Insurgency, (N. Carolina: The University of North Carolina, 1970), p. 20. 
175 Ibid., p. 93. 
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Communists, but instead committed atrocities and abuses against the people. The CHDF 
was branded as an arm of the local politicians and powerful political warlords. The 
militias were accused by both local and international human rights groups as very abusive 
and coercive against the people. The government had neglected the people and the 
paramilitaries became its tool of abuse.  
During the long period of turmoil and chaos from 1974 until 1987 under the 
undisciplined and abusive militias, the people had resorted to organizing and forming 
their armed groups for their own protection. Several armed groups later emerged to be 
called vigilantes and had no distinction from the government militias because, in the long 
run, they also committed abuses.  
The government was pressured to disband the CHDF and all illegal armed groups 
for their abusive acts and human rights violations committed against the people. 
However, the insurgency continued to grow and prosper. It was able to recoup and regain 
strength to fight the government forces again. The AFP did not take advantage of the time 
when Sison, Commander Dante and other Communist leaders were jailed and had 
absolutely no contact with the organization. The NPA splintered into several groups 
during this period that tried to survive independently on their own with no support from 
the CPP Central Committee and from its political organization, the National Democratic 
Front based in Manila. 
B. AFP’S REFORMED PARAMILITARY FORCES 
The AFP recommended reviving the militias to assist the government forces in 
fighting the Communists. This time the AFP learned several lessons from the previous 
militias, such as that improper utilization would prolong the insurgency problem. The 
militias being referred to were the CHDF previously organized to assist the AFP in its 
counterinsurgency operations. It would be detrimental to the legitimacy of the armed 
forces to protect the people and the communities from the insurgents and other lawless 
elements of society. The AFP realized that the proper use and adequate control of militias 
would help combat insurgency. Separation of the populace from the insurgents is an 
important element in defeating the insurgents. The insurgents would lose their mass base 
support and their sanctuaries for survival. 
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The reformed militias had a significant role to play in the counterinsurgency 
campaign. The proper use of the government militias as envisioned would mean 
obtaining the popular base of the insurgents, winning over the people and eventually 
gaining the people’s support against the Communist movement.  
The AFP has defined the clear role and mission, the functions, the training, the 
means of recruiting, the pay and allowances and other benefits of the CAA as well as the 
mode of control and relations with the local elected officials. The armed forces aimed to 
primarily utilize the paramilitary forces to separate the populace from the insurgents, and 
at the same time, gain the people’s support for the insurgency campaign against the 
CPP/NPA. However, the present guidelines and SOP for the utilization of the CAA still 
need to be improved and enhanced with regard to training and command and control. 
Many debacles recently involving CAA detachments were caused by the incompetence of 
both cadres and militias, and ineffective command and control. The CAA must conduct 
regular training to enhance competence and professionalism among the cadres and 
militias.  The CAA has been active in village defense and had regained many villages 
previously influenced by the Communists. These villages are now supporting the 
government campaign. However, better command and control aspect still needs to be 
studied to maximize the use of paramilitaries against the insurgency. After all, the total 
defeat of insurgency is the overall aim of the government and the armed forces. 
C. VIABLE OPTIONS 
The following options will further improve and enhance the use of CAA 
paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency campaign. 
1. Organize One CAA Battalion that Will Administer and Manage the 
CAA 
Due to budgetary constraints, the AFP may not be able to organize the number of 
battalions as per organization of the CAA. But at least it can mobilize one battalion in 
non-insurgency infested areas and two battalions in heavily infested areas. There are 
three divisions that comprise a big number of CAA members. Therefore, a total of 12 





• Unity of Command and Control is achieved on the administration and 
supervision of the CAA. 
• The AFP’s operations clear-hold-support methodology can still be 
implemented. 
• The AFP campaign plan will push through as envisioned. 
• Maneuver battalions will continue to perform its mission to combat the 
communist movement. 
• The AFP will not implement major reorganization and adjustments in the 
operational boundaries of major units. 
• The training of all CAA will be standard and more focused on village 
defense, security of the populace and prevention of the incursion of the 
Communist insurgents. 
• The shoot and communicate capabilities of CAA detachments, particularly 
those located in remote villages, will be addressed. 
• The holding unit will attend to the administrative problems such as 
delayed subsistence allowances and benefits for CAA members, as well as 
operational support. Morale of CAA members will remain high. 
• “Ghost” CAA members will be eliminated. “Ghost” means that some 
CAA members exist in the payroll only. This problem can be easily 
checked because there will be only 12 battalion commanders responsible 
for the payroll of all CAA members. The auditing and resources 
management procedures will be simpler and lesser chance of corruption. 
• The CAA battalions will be directly concerned on the development of the 
skills and expertise of all CAA members.  
• The CAA will be more responsive and receptive to their roles as village 
defense and as protector of the populace.    
b. Disadvantages 
• Entails great costs to personnel and equipment requirements (firepower, 
mobility, and communication) to include training and arming. 
• The implementation and transition period will be longer because of 
recruitment, training, arming, construction of facilities and other 
administrative requirements. 






2.  Designate One Battalion in Every Brigade to Handle the 
Administration and Management of CAA Members 
A brigade has three maneuver battalions. A total of 27 battalions will be used for 
CAA duties. The remaining maneuver battalions will have expanded area of operations 
because of the area previously occupied by the other battalion. 
a. Advantages 
• Unity of Command and Control is achieved for the administration and 
supervision of the CAA 
• Supports the AFP’ Operational clear hold support methodology 
• Minimal time of transition and implementation 
• Training, arming and fill up of personnel requirements entail lesser costs. 
b. Disadvantages 
• The AFP campaign plan is disrupted because of reduced maneuver 
battalions. This option will make at least 27 battalions or approximately 
30% of the previous maneuver battalions to be designated for territorial 
functions. 
• There will be more petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) and mobility 
requirements because of the extended areas of coverage. 
• Battalions designated for CAA duties will need additional personnel and 
equipment (firepower, mobility, and communication) fill up, and training. 
• The AFP will implement major readjustments of operational boundaries of 
major units.  
• The maneuver battalions and other mobile forces will have expanded area 
of operations.  
3.  The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Will Handle the 
Administration of the CAA Nationwide 
SOCOM is composed of the Scout Ranger Regiment, the Special Forces 
Regiment and the Civil Affairs Group. 
a. Advantages 
• Unity of Command and Control is achieved on the administration and 
supervision of all CAA 
• SOCOM does not need training because they know how to handle the 
CAA in terms of recruitment, training, arming and other administrative 
functions 
• Maneuver battalions can concentrate on internal security operations 
because they are relieved of territorial functions 
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b. Disadvantages 
• SOCOM will need to filled up on personnel and equipment requirements 
• The AFP campaign plan will be disrupted because many SOCOM units 
are currently deployed to support the Area Commands for special 
operations missions. 
• SOCOM units (Scout Rangers, Special Forces and Civil Affairs) will be 
only utilized for territorial functions. 
4. Other Options 
There are other options that can be tested and implemented to seek better 
command and control of all the CAA, but these options entail large amounts of financial 
resources in personnel, equipment (firepower, mobility and communication), facilities, 
trainings and other administrative needs. These options are not preferred not only because 
of financial constraint but more because of operational considerations such transition 
time and organizational problems. These options are: 
• Designate one battalion in every division as the CAA administrators 
• Designate the AFP Reserve Command to handle the CAA administration 
• Task the PNP to handle the administration of the CAA nationwide 
• Restructure the battalions’ organization by adding one company as the 
administrator for the CAA 
D. RECOMMENDATION 
Considering the advantages and disadvantages, the most viable and workable 
option is the organization of one CAA battalion in a division with less insurgency and at 
least two CAA battalions in heavily insurgent infested areas. This option entails great 
financial cost initially but on the operational standpoint, it is the most feasible option in 
the long run. The primary role and function of the CAA battalions is to administer, 
manage and supervise the activities of the CAA members. CAA battalions will be 
responsible for the administrative and operational activities of all CAA in the division. 
CAA battalions will primarily command and control all CAA members.  
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Figure 1.   Manning of CAA Company (From: General Headquarters Letter of 
Instruction 20/01 (TANGOL- BAYAN CHARLIE) issued on August 20, 2001). 
 
Company Headquarters   Grade   Strength 
Company Commander   01- 03        1 
Company First Sgt    E7- E8        1 
Supply Sgt     E5- E6        1 
Admin/ Finance/ Intel NCO  E5- E6        1 
Asst Supply Sgt    CAA         1 




Rifle Platoons (3) 
Platoon leader    E6    1 
Team leader     E4    2 
Riflemen     CAA    22 
 
Recapitulation 
Company Headquarters   Officer   1 
      EP    3 
      CAA    22 
Rifle Platoons (3)    EP    9 
      CAA    66 
     TOTAL    101 
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APPENDIX B.  ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS OF CAA/SCAA 
Emolument Regular CAA Amount Special CAA Amount 
Subsistence 
Allowance 





Php 60 per 






Can avail AFPEBSO 












Treated in military hospitals for 
injuries and sickness incurred in 
the line of duty as authorized by 









that all expenses 
incurred out of the 
treatment of the 
SCAA are shouldered 
by the business firm 









Yearly Issuance of Basic CAA 




CCIEs of 10 line 
items to be shouldered 










Special financial assistance 
pursuant to RA 6963 
AFP MBAI insurance benefit 
Depends on 













Members of a deactivated CAA 
company shall be entitled to a 
separation gratuity in accordance 
with the provisions of AFP 








for members of a 
deactivated SCAA 
company shall be 
granted by the 






































Assistance to be given 

















































a. Military Honors provided 
by the AFP 
b. The Philippine flag shall be 
presented to the wife or 
family of the CAA who 
dies. while: 
i.    On active duty or 
active duty training 
ii.   Performing authorized 
travel to and from the 
area of deployment or 
training. 
iii.Hospitalized/undergoing 
treatment for injuries 
incurred or disease 
contracted while on 
active duty or training. 
 a. Military Honors 
to be provided by 
the AFP 
b. The Philippine 
flag shall be 
presented to the 
wife or family of 
the SCAA who 
dies. While: 
i.  On active duty 




travel to and 















Table 1. Allowances and Benefits of CAA/SCAA (From: General Headquarters Letter of 
Instruction 20/01 (TANGOL- BAYAN CHARLIE) issued on August 20, 2001). 
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APPENDIX C.  PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAA/SCAA 
BASIC MILITARY TRAINING (12 WEEKS) 
SUBJECTS                    NO. OF PERIODS 
I. SERVICE ORIENTATION MODULE (1st – 2nd Week)  52 
  Mission and Organization of AFP    4 
  CAA Organization and Administration    8 
  Legal Bases of CAFGU Creation    8 
  Military Courtesy and Discipline    8 
  CAFGU Rules and Regulations     8 
  Guard Duty       4 
  Drills and Ceremonies      4 
  AFP Physical Fitness Program     4 
  Marches and Bivouacs      4 
 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL RELATIONS (2nd – 4th Week)  104 
 
 And VALUE FORMATION MODULE 
 
  Human Rights and Int’l Humanitarian Law   48 
  Rules of Land Warfare      8 
  Rules of Engagement      8 
  AFP Code of Ethics      16 
  Civil Relations       8 
  Character Guidance and Value Formation   16 
 
III. JUSTICE and LAW and ORDER MODULE (5th Week)  32 
 
  Military Justice       16 
  Pertinent Laws on Revised Penal Code    16 
 
IV. INDIVIDUAL SKILLS DEV’T MODULE (6th – 7th Week)  60 
 
  Elem Map Reading and Ground Nav    12 
  Intelligence Training      4 
  Elementary Signal Communication    4 
  Concealment and Camouflage     4 
  Personal Hygiene, First Aid and Fld Sanitation   4 
  Hand to Hand Combat      16 
  Individual Day and Night Training    16 
 
V. WEAPONS PROFICIENCY MODULE (8th – 10th Week)  68 
  
  Individual Weapons Training     16 
  Preparatory Marksmanship Training    16 
  Record Firing       16 
  Grenades       8 
  Night Firing Techniques     12 
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VI. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS MODULE (11th – 12th Week)  116 
 
  OFFENSE (48 periods) 
 
  Squad tactics       8 
  Techniques of fire      4 
  Patrolling       8 
  Raids        4 
  Ambuscades       4 
  Cordon and Search      4 
  Special Operation TEAM Training    16 
 
  DEFENSE (68 periods) 
 
  Field Fortification      8 
  Landmine Warfare      8 
  Battle Indoctrination      8 
  Harbouring       8 
  Immediate Action Drill      12 
  Route Security Operations     4 
  Movement Security      4 
  Perimeter Defense      4 
  Checkpoint Operations      4 
  Counter Guerilla Operations     8 
 
VII. PRACTICAL EXERCISES (As scheduled) 
  
  Inspections, Drills and Ceremonies    24 
  Marches and Bivouacs      16 
  Physical Fitness Exercise     24 
 
VIII. TROOPS INFORMATION AND EDUCATION   12 
 
IX. MILITARY STAKES, EXAMINATION AND CRITIQUE 16 
 
X. COMMANDER’S TIME     ______4_______    
 
  TOTAL      528 Periods 
 
 
Table 2. Program of Instructions for CAA/SCAA Basic Military Training (12 Weeks) 
(From: General Headquarters Letter of Instruction 20/01 (TANGOL- BAYAN 
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